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ABSTRACT
Businesses do evolve. Their evolution necessitates the re-engineering of their
existing "business processes”, with the objectives of reducing costs, delivering
services on time, and enhancing their profitability in a competitive market. This is
generally true and particularly in domains such as manufacturing, pharmaceuticals
and education).
The central objective of workflow technologies is to separate business policies
(which normally are encoded in business logics) from the underlying business ap-
plications. Such a separation is desirable as it improves the evolution of business
processes and, more often than not, facilitates the re-engineering at the organi-
sation level without the need to detail knowledge or analyses of the application
themselves. Workflow systems are currently used by many organisations with a
wide range of interests and specialisations in many domains. These include, but
not limited to, office automation, finance and banking sector, health-care, art,
tele-communications, manufacturing and education.
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We take the view that a workflow is a set of "activities”, each performs a piece of
functionality within a given "context” and may be constrained by some security
requirements. These activities are coordinated to collectively achieve a required
business objective. The specification of such coordination is presented as a set of
"execution constraints” which include parallelisation (concurrency/distribution),
serialisation, restriction, alternation, compensation 1 and so on.
Activities within workflows could be carried out by humans, various software-
based application programs, or processing entities according to the organisational
rules, such as meeting deadlines or performance improvement. Workflow exe-
cution can involve a large number of different participants, services and devices
which may cross the boundaries of various organisations and accessing variety of
data. This raises the importance of
• context variations and context-awareness and
• security (e.g. access control and privacy).
The specification of precise rules, which prevent unauthorised participants from
executing sensitive tasks and also to prevent tasks from accessing unauthorised
services or (commercially) sensitive information, are crucially important. For ex-
ample, medical scenarios will require that
1Compensation is a mechanism by which previously completed activities can be undone or
compensated (following the logic defined by the application) when a subsequent failure occurs.
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• only authorised doctors are permitted to perform certain tasks,
• a patient medical records are not allowed to be accessed by anyone without
the patient consent and
• that only specific machines are used to perform given tasks at a given time.
If a workflow execution cannot guarantee these requirements, then the flow will
be rejected. Furthermore, features/characteristics of security requirement are both
temporal- and/or event-related. However, most of the existing models are of a
static nature – for example, it is hard, if not impossible, to express security re-
quirements which are
• time-dependent (e.g. A customer is allowed to be overdrawn by 100 pounds
only up-to the first week of every month.
• event-dependent (e.g. A bank account can only be manipulated by its owner
unless there is a change in the law or after six months of his/her death)2.
Currently, there is no commonly accepted model for secure and context-aware
workflows or even a common agreement on which features a workflow security
model should support. We have developed a novel approach to design, analyse
and validate workflows. The approach has the following components:
2Here, change in the law and death are two events, and the later one has a timing-dependency.
Once one of these events occurs, the current policies must be suspended and new ones have to be
applied/enforced.
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• A modelling/design language (known as CS−F low). The language has the
following features:
– support concurrency;
– context and context awareness are first-class citizens;
– supports mobility as activities can move from one context to another;
– has the ability to express timing constrains: delay, deadlines, priority
and schedulability;
– allows the expressibility of security policies (e.g. access control and
privacy) without the need for extra linguistic complexities; and
– enjoy sound formal semantics that allows us to animate designs and
compare various designs.
• An approach known as communication-closed layer is developed, that al-
lows us to serialise a highly distributed workflow to produce a semantically
equivalent quasi-sequential flow which is easier to understand and analyse.
Such re-structuring, gives us a mechanism to design fault-tolerant work-
flows as layers are atomic activities and various existing forward and back-
ward error recovery techniques can be deployed.
• Provide a reduction semantics to CS−F low that allows us to build a tool
support to animate a specifications and designs. This has been evaluated
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on a Health care scenario, namely the Context Aware Ward (CAW ) sys-
tem. Health care provides huge amounts of business workflows, which will
benefit from workflow adaptation and support through pervasive computing
systems. The evaluation takes two complementary strands:
– provide CS−F low’s models and specifications and
– formal verification of time-critical component of a workflow.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Objectives
• Motivate the need for secure and context aware workflow systems and state, in a
precise terms the research question.
• outline our research methodology
• Articulate our research findings
• Outline the structure of the thesis
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Chapter 1. Introduction 30
1.1 Introduction
The separation of business logic/processes and rules and their underlying tech-
nologies that realise them, has been the concern of both industrialists and aca-
demics for many decades. Businesses evolve and their underlying technologies
evolve too. Their evolution occur at rather different rates. Business evolves as a
response, for example, of political pressure and the continual presence of compet-
itive element. The response to such interplay, the evolution of business process-
es/logic and their supporting technologies, has to be rapid taking into account the
whole development life-cycle.
The central objective and goal of workflow technology is to separate business poli-
cies (which normally have been encoded in business logic) from the underlying
business applications. Such a separation is desirable as it improves the evolution
of business processes and, more often than not, facilitates the re-engineering at the
organization level without the need to detail knowledge or analyses of the applica-
tion themselves. Workflow systems are currently used by many organisations with
a wide range of interests, specialisations and application domains. These include,
but not limited to, office automation, finance and banking sector, health-care,
art, tele-communications, manufacturing and education. We take the view that
a workflow is a set of “activities", each performs a piece of functionality within
a given “context" and may be constrained by some security requirements. These
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activities are coordinated to achieve a required business objective. The specifica-
tion of such coordination is presented as a set of “execution constraints" which
include parallelisation (concurrency/distribution), serialisation, restriction, alter-
nation, compensation and so on. For example, a workflow scenario for the man-
agement of a warehouse organises and controls the movement of goods around
the warehouse and where about, and the way goods are being stored as efficiently
and as safely as possible. These activities, and many others, are to be achieved
through the precise definition, processing and realisation of many complex trans-
actions, including goods’ shipping, receiving, putting away, picking up and de-
livering. Activities within workflows could be carried out by humans, various
software-based application programs, or processing entities according to the un-
derlying organisational rules, such as meeting deadlines or performance improve-
ment. Workflow execution can involve a large number of different participants,
services and devices which may cross the boundaries of various organisations.
This raises important issues that are related to context-awareness and security. It
is important to be able to specify exact rules to prevent unauthorised participants
from executing sensitive tasks and also to prevent tasks from accessing unautho-
rised services. For example, medical scenarios will require that only authorised
doctors are permitted to perform certain tasks and that only specific machines are
used in those tasks. If a workflow execution cannot guarantee these requirements,
then the flow will be rejected.
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Furthermore, workflows can hold and manipulate various data with different secu-
rity requirements and it is important to enforce these requirements while the data
is accessed in a workflow instance. Delegations, constraints over authorisations,
audit and integrity provide additional security features. We adopt a policy-based
approach in which rules are specified compositionally as policies which may be
analysed and verified at run-time. Currently, there is no commonly accepted
model for secure workflows or even a consensus on which features a workflow
security model should support. For example, [6, 71] give typical policy-based
models in which policies are “static". By static we mean that policies have no
dependency on time or the sudden occurrence of events. Such dependencies are
important as they permit policies to change at run time. It is often desirable, and
sometimes crucial in many workflows, that after the elapse of a period of time or
the occurrence of a particular event, new policies will be adopted and enforced
rendering the old ones obsolete. Temporal/timing aspects of access control re-
quirements are especially important in domains ranging from E-business to even
military domain where the value of tactical information are highly dependent on
time, (for example, time to start a mission and its duration) and events (e.g. civil-
ian accidents, or change in troops formation). The work reported in [21, 23] has
recognised the need for temporal/timing-dependent policies. However, these mod-
els and others lack compositionality and efficient mechanisms for enforcing them
at run-time. Furthermore, activities within a workflow may be performed within
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various contexts. These contexts could be different platforms (hardware, operat-
ing systems, communication speed, etc.) and/or at different locations. Sensing
the particular context information, may alter the security constraints and hence an
appropriate execution platform may be chosen. In summary, Current workflow
design languages and their supporting management systems do not handle these
two aspects, namely security- and context-aware.
1.2 Research Question
How can we design, develop and build a context-aware, secure
workflow system in an integrated fashion?
the quest to answer this question has led to various sub-questions which needed
to be addressed. These are
1. What is the “nature" of context in workflow systems?
2. What are the various considerations or dimensions of “security" in the pres-
ence of mobility and context-awareness?
3. How do we “model" these system, with attributes such as being highly dis-
tributed, context-aware, time-dependent, allow mobility and being security-
critical?
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4. Policy-based approaches have been shown to be valuable tools, how can
these policies be represented within context-awareness?
5. Being highly distributed, is there a more efficient mechanism for the de-
sign and development of context-aware, secure workflow systems that is
amenable to analysis?
6. Is there a provision for animation?
This thesis will deal with these sub-questions and provides a unique mechanism
for answering the main research question.
1.3 Original Contribution
We have developed a novel approach to design, analyse and continually validate
workflows within any organisation. The approach has the following components:
• A design language (known as CS−F low). The language enjoys the follow-
ing features:
– support concurrency;
– context and context-awareness are first-class citizen;
– supports mobility as activities can move from one context to another;
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– has the ability to express timing constrains: delay, deadlines, priority
and schedulability;
– allows the expressibility of (access control) security policies without
the need for an extra linguistic complexities; and
– enjoys sound formal semantics that allows us to animate design and
compare various designs.
• An approach known as communication-close layer is developed, that al-
lows us to serialise a highly distributed workflow to produce a semantically
equivalent quasi-sequential flow which is easier to understand and analyse.
Such re-structuring, gives us a mechanism to design fault-tolerant work-
flows as layers are atomic activities and various existing forward and back-
ward error recovery techniques can be deployed.
• Provide a reduction semantics to CS−F low that allows us to build a tool
support to animate a specifications and designs. This has been evaluated on
a Health care scenario, namely the CAW system.
1.4 Research Methodology
Our methodology follow a typical software engineering steps. These are
• Engaging critically with the existing literature and tools support for work-
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flow systems and various applications. This has led to a clear articulation
of the research question and scope our efforts to efficiently solve the rising
issues (Chapter 2).
• To gain further understandings of the way we can solve these issues, we
model the situation through a computational model which is then formalised
and supported by a notation for design and analysis. This has resulted in
CS−F low (Chapters 3-6).
• To demonstrate that our techniques are valid we have illustrated it in a num-
ber of small case study and end with a realistic case-study from the health-
care domain (Chapter 7).
1.5 Measure of Success
Measuring success has two components:
1. Demonstrate that our research questions have been resolved and answered:
Chapter 3-6;
2. show that our approach performs better than other existing ones: Chapter 7.
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1.6 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organised in some eight chapters each has its objectives and ratio-
nale1. The rationale of all Chapters are thus given below. Its structure is depicted
in Figure(1.1) below In Chapter 2, we provide
• critical engagement with previous work on Workflow principles and existing
systems and
• motivate research questions and define context
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 give details of a computation model for our Secure, Context
aware Workflow systems. In particular, we
• provide an informal description of the computational model for a context-
aware and secure workflow systems,
• describe our design language, CS−F low, and how it could be used,
• give a denotational (specification-oriented semantics in a process algebraic
style) for CS−F low,
• give an algebraic characterisation of CS−F low, and
• provide the concept of closed layers and give a development process that
supports it.
1A reader who is familiar with issues in Workflows and security can skip Chapter 2.
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Chapter 6 outlines the design of a tool that serves as a proof-of-concept towards
the executability of CS−F low. Chapter 7, provides a realistic case study from
health care domain as a means of evaluating our approach. Chapter 8, summaries
our findings and concludes with some future work.
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Figure(1.1): Thesis Chart
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Chapter 2
WORKFLOW SYSTEMS
State-of-the-Art
Objectives
• Critical engagement with previous work on workflow principles and existing sys-
tems
• Motivate research questions and define context
41
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2.1 Introduction
A business process is a set of activities that are (appropriately) arranged to achieve
a given business goal. These arrangements are commonly structured and many of
these processes are traditionally well understood, predictable, repeatable and have
real-time constraints. The activities in these processes are normally distinct, and
the control between them flows in a well defined manner and decisions involved
are simple, clear and made in a deterministic fashion. However, with the advent of
ubiquitous computing environment, these traditional tasks have the extra require-
ment that they must decide on the next service according to the user’s situation
( known as contextual information) which is continually and dynamically chang-
ing. Most of the popular modelling techniques have no consideration/support for
dealing with this contextual information (e.g. [127], [70], and [26]). In this thesis
we take the view that workflow systems are inherently context-aware and the fact
that it is highly distributed and their activities cross the boundaries of many organ-
isations lend themselves to be security-critical. This is in addition to the fact that
some of its activities must satisfy variety of timing constraints. In this Chap-
ter we give a general overview of workflows and their importance in everyday
businesses and enterprises. Simply stated, a workflow has
• a goal,
• an input,
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• an output,
• a number of activities which are performed in some order,
• may have some timing constraints,
• uses variety of resources of different specifications,
• may affect more than one organisation unit and
• creates some value for users1.
Modern workflow systems cross the boundaries of organisations, each has its own
security requirements, policies and constraints. Even within one organisation, ac-
tivities in a workflow systems may be executed, in one of its instances, within
a platform but in another instance it may be executed or performed on a differ-
ent platform with completely different environment. Indeed it may not even be
automated. In this chapter we review current techniques and technologies and
demonstrate the lack of these consideration.
The review concentrates on three aspects: Workflow Management Systems and
their de facto standard (Sections (2.2) and (2.3)), Security requirements (Section(2.4))
and Context-Aware system and Adaptation (Section(2.6)).
1“value" here refers to the benefit of the “output". This will depends on the user(s) of the
workflow (which may include other workflows). “value" may be customer satisfaction, gaining
market lead, etc. “value" may be a transitional value that may be needed to achieve the overall
goal of the workflow. For example skip is an activity/workflow with a transitional value.
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2.2 Workflow and Workflow Management Systems
Workflow is often related to Business Process Re-engineering (BPR). BPR in-
volves the following steps:
• assess the need for change – either to improve efficiency or response to
economic/political pressure, etc.
• analyse existing processes and their dependencies – to establish if, for ex-
ample, they still meet business goals.
• construct new model(s) of current and future situation need (including en-
vironment), and
• finally realisation of all fundamental business processes, and/or any other
(auxiliary) business entities.
A workflow system is defined as
The computerised facilitation or automation of a business process, in
whole or part. [65]
There is a direct correlation between workflows and BPR. Sometimes, workflow
implementations form a part of a BPR exercise, yet not all BPR operations may
result in the implementations of workflows. However, workflow technologies pro-
vides adequate solution as there is a clear separation between business logic and
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its supporting IT infrastructure. This separation is rather important as it allows
rapid changes to the rules that define the business process. In order to manage
the sequence of work activities and determine the invocation of the appropriate
resources (human or IT resources) needed for the activities, a Workflow Manage-
ment System is needed. It is a fast evolving technology which is being exploited
by businesses in a variety of industries and organisations, including the office en-
vironment where the number of operations that are conducted by employees are
large such as insurance, banking, legal and general administration, etc. It is also
applicable to some classes of industrial, manufacturing, health service and mili-
tary applications. The Workflow Reference model defines Workflow Management
System as:
A system that completely defines, manages and executes "workflows”
through the execution of software whose order of execution is driven
by a computer representation of the workflow logic. [65]
Due to its continual popularity and driven by the need to provide support for BPR
and the need for requirements integration that is resulting from the wide-range
of specialisation of products and the variety of markets and domains, the Work-
flow Management Coalition (WfMC) and the Object Management Group (OMG)
have provided a common framework within which interoperability and communi-
cation standards are developed that allow the coexistence of the various workflow
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products.
2.3 Workflow Reference Model
There are some common characteristics which workflow management products
share. These characteristics are believed to potentially enable systems to achieve
a level of interoperability through the use of common standards of various func-
tions. As a result, the WfM Coalition (WfMC) has been formed to identify these
functional areas and develop appropriate specifications to be implemented within
any workflow products. Their ultimate goal is to improve the effective develop-
ment of workflow technologies across the IT market to the benefit of their vendors
and users.
The WfMC Reference Model takes a rather general view of workflow manage-
ment, and outlines a common model that intends to accommodate the various
implementation techniques and their underlying technological infrastructure and
operational environments. The standard was developed by considering various
structures of generic workflow applications. These structures contain a number
of generic components which communicate with each other in a number of de-
fined ways; different technologies may exhibit different capabilities within each
of these generic components. The process of achieving interoperability is com-
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monly done by establishing a set of standardised interfaces as well as precisely
defining data exchange formats between such components. This is followed by
the construction of a number of distinct interoperability scenarios by reference
to these interfaces, identifying various levels of functional conformance as ap-
propriate to the range of existing technologies. There are three functional areas,
at the highest level, that all WfM systems provide support for, [65], see Figure 2.1:
Application
and IT Tools
Workflow Enactement Service
Process Definition
Business Process Analysis,Modelling
and Definition Tools
Build Time
Run Time
Process Instantiation and Control
Interaction with Users
And Application Tools
Process Design and
Definition
Process Changes
Figure 2.1 – Workflow Process [65]
• Build-time functions. This is concerned with defining, and possibly mod-
elling, the workflow process and its activities. This support is provided at
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the design stage of a workflow. It is the phase in which the goal is translated
into technical design of the workflow. I.e. a business process is translated
from an informal requirement document into a formal, design definition.
This is done using one or more of the existing analysis, modelling and sys-
tem techniques (e.g. [26], [127], [70]). The resulting specification/descrip-
tion is known as either a process model, a process template, process meta-
data, or a process definition, e.g. [26, 65]. This is the phase that we are
concerned with in this thesis and which both security, context and timing
requirements are specified, designed and analysed. The result of this pro-
cess is a description of a number of discrete activity steps, with associated
computer and/or human operations and rules governing the execution of
the process through the various activity steps. The process description may
be expressed in textual or graphical form or in a formal language notation
(similar to CS−F low (cf. next Chapter). Dynamic alterations to process
description from the run-time operational environment can be specified.
• Run-time control functions. This phase is responsible of the actual exe-
cution of the process description that is resulted from the above phase. It
is concerned with the management of the execution of the workflow pro-
cesses in an operational setting and the orchestration (e.g. sequencing) of
the various activities to be handled as part of each process. This may involve
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various static/dynamic scheduling algorithms. Major challenge which we
address in the thesis is that modern workflows is characterised by mobility
and context which place extra constraints at design level.
• Run-time interactions. Interactions here are with human users as well as
with any IT application tools for processing the variety of activity steps in
any instance of a workflow. One of the challenges in this facility is that at
each instance, the underlying infrastructure and the IT support (e.g. plat-
forms) can (and many cases do) change.
These run-time process control functions act as the linkage between the
process as modelled within the process specification (the design phase) and
the process as it is seen in the real world (i.e. its implementation), reflected
in the runtime interactions of users and IT application tools.
The core component towards realising these functionalities is the realm of work-
flow management control software (or engine),which is often widely distributed
and are executed on a variety of platforms. In summary, it is responsible for the
• creation and deletion of processes (and in our case in the present thesis the
ability to change context and security policies);
• controlling of the activity scheduling within an operational process and
varying contexts/environments; and
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• interaction with various application tools or human resources.
In addition to specifications for process definition, data and its exchange protocols,
WfMC, [65], provides a wide range of interfaces. These include interfaces to
support:
• interoperability between different workflows;
• communication with a wide variety of IT application types;
• interaction with user through interface functions; and
• system monitoring and provides metric functions to facilitate the manage-
ment of composed/integrated workflow application environments
2.3.1 Critique of standards
We have outlined the attempt that WfMC made to standardised the way workflow
management systems should be designed and developed. The standard follows
a typical software engineering life cycle and identified the typical issue such life
cycle has. However, the standard has missed the opportunities to identify crucial
issue relating to security and contexts. There is no provision for either and curren-
t/modern workflow system faces these issues. This is the topic of the subsequent
chapters in this thesis.
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2.4 Security Requirements
2.4.1 General security Requirements
As we mentioned early that complex day to day workflows in large enterprises
and organisations are managed and facilitated by WfMSs. Fundamental and ma-
jor issues with current WfMSs are that they often use heterogeneous and widely
distributed hardware and software systems to execute a set of activities within a
given workflow. This gives rise to decentralised security requirements 2 and the
need to establish variety of mechanisms that ensure the correct enforcement of
these requirements. Indeed this in turn need to be carefully and adequately man-
aged. Since security is an essential and integral part of workflows, the WfMS has
to manage the execution of workflows in a secure manner. In particular, a robust
secure workflow model is needed to (see for example, [79], [80] and [141])
• allow controlled access of data objects and ensure their privacy and integrity,
• secure execution of tasks in the presence of variety of contexts, and
• efficient management and administration of security requirements.
For critical and strategic applications, major concerns regarding the threats against
the security properties/requirements, in particular, integrity and confidentiality of
2Our treatment to Requirements encompasses the notion of policy. In fact, at a formal level, a
requirement and a policy are indistinguishable.
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data and processes. These properties include:
• Integrity which prevents the unauthorised modification of information [68].
Integrity here ensures the correctness and appropriateness of the content
of a piece of information in a given context – a piece of information may
be appropriate for a given user in one context but not so in another. In-
tegrity is also related to the legitimate pattern of operations in data accesses
(hence policies that govern integrity requirements are intrinsically history-
preserving, [74,75]). In a workflow, no data should be modified or corrupted
by unauthorized activities.
• Authorisation is the process of identifying to the system the various func-
tions which a user may undertake [68]. In a role-based authorisation, par-
ticular privileges may be associated with certain roles to execute activities
and/or access certain resources. In a workflow, authorisation means that no
data or resource is accessed by unauthorised activities at anytime. Once
again, the roles of a user may be dependent on the context in which the user
finds him/herself in.
• Availability prevents the unauthorised withholding of information or re-
sources [68]. The resource should be available at hand within a specific
time frame (session) once it is needed. There is a clear interplay between
availability and reliability of information. Here we are only concerned with
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availability in the sense that, in a workflow, data or resource(s) must be at
the activity’s disposal when needed for legitimate use.
In order to ensure these three security properties of a workflow, a WfMS must
manage and protect all the information of a workflow from build-time (or at a de-
sign phase) to run-time within a secure framework.
As a security framework has to prevent any unauthorised modification of data and
to enforce the legitimate pattern of operations in data accesses by an activity, the
WfMS hence needs to know when and what data and privilege(s) to be granted
to this activity and at which time instant/period and also to be revoked from the
activity. Further, the WfMS needs to know the conflict of interest [68, 111] for
every activity (especially when roles are considered).
2.4.2 WfMC and Security Requirements
As we mentioned earlier that there is a no commonly accepted secure workflow
model. We take the view that a workflow security model should support some
basic requirements. These include:
• Activities are only executed by authorised users and that authorised activi-
ties are to access particular services. Provision for conflict resolution should
be provided.
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• Context-awareness is important as context and the surrounding environment
influence the security decisions and may force mobility and adaptation.
• Due to the highly distributed nature of current workflows, a provision for
the secure distributed workflow execution should be given and that the abil-
ity to specify constraints over workflow migrations and the distribution of
activities.
• Adaptability is important and a security framework should allow for the
modification of security policies through, for example, dynamic policy changes.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following addition features are
required for any workflow security model:
• Ability to specify privacy constrain over data which are to be manipulated
by activities.
• Ensure trusted platforms over which users (human and/or activity) can be
authenticated.
Workflow systems process highly valued information to those who own it and
therefore it is important to protect this information from any threats whether com-
ing from outside or inside. In a policy-based approach, a security policy typically
reflects the security requirements for the workflow. A policy is a set of rules and
procedures controlling the use of information, from processing, storage, to their
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distribution and presentation [68]. Security requirements can describe the types
and levels of protection needed for equipment, data, information, applications, and
facilities to meet a security policy [68]. For example, a policy can be as simple as
a nurse at a grade X is authorised to measure blood pressure.
Referring to the WfMC [65], we define a secure workflow as a computer sup-
ported business process which is able to protect it against security threats and fur-
ther satisfies the security requirements as specified by the business goals. Further,
a secure Workflow Management System (WfMS) is a workflow management
system that allows the specification, management and the execution of secure
workflows.
The WfMC has recommended what is known as a security profile in which the
security services, to be applied for interoperability between two parties, are iden-
tified. The issue with the profile is in its static nature, in the sense that it is con-
structed at a design/build-time and does not take into account the various contexts
that complex modern workflows are facing. In addition, whilst WfMC presents
protocols for the interoperability between two components, the flow of authorisa-
tions amongst these components, tasks and resources during the workflow execu-
tion are not considered within the protocols.
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2.4.3 Existing Models
Here we review some of the existing models that have adopted and proposed
within the discipline of Computer Security in general.
Access Control. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models [122] lie at the
heart of any authentication process which allocate users into roles. Some work
on security in BPEL processes, e.g. [24] and [82], rely on authenticating a user
through credential checking, but they do not specify what credentials or how they
are checked.
WS-Security [2], [112], [113], [114], [110] and SAML [3] are two popular web
service standards. These can be used to provide secure authentications between
different services. A security token, for example in the case of WS-Security, is ap-
pended (such as certificates) to SOAP Messages. This can be viewed as a protocol
to securely exchange messages between web services by providing confidential-
ity and integrity of SOAP messages. The SAML standard attempts to solve the
Single-Sign-On problem, where a user is authenticated once by a service which is
in turn gives an assertion (or a capability) that other services use to authenticate
the user – the user does not need to supply his/her credentials again.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [117], is another access control mechanism
which has been used widely in file systems. DAC was designed to model security
of objects (e.g. files on the basis of a single subject’s defined privileges (i.e. users).
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Within this framework, predicates are used to describe the types of access that a
subject has over an object. These predicates which has to be evaluated to "true” for
granting access or "false” otherwise. Within a file system, for example, privileges
can be read, write, delete, create and copy3.
The Workflow Authorisation Model (WAM) [14, 15] is another conceptual and
logical model. Execution environment is provided in which the enforcement of
authorisation rules in activity dependency and transaction processing are empha-
sised. This is performed largely by using Petri Nets (PN):
• Authorisation Template (AT) at the design phase is defined where static
parameters of the authorization are listed.
• when an activity starts execution, the AT is used to derive the actual autho-
risation value.
Static analysis is performed prior execution and all privileges that are granted
during execution are stored with the WAM environment. However, it does not
consider history of the flows. Further, it does not monitor the event(s) generated
during the execution of task. Petri net was extended to what is known as Secure
Petri Net (SPN) was proposed. SPN was used to detect conflicts and attempt to re-
3We note here that the support required in workflow security relates to the activity’s granu-
larity. This has motivated DAC’s extension to cater for the security properties of Integrity and
Authorization for workflow.
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solve it. The ability to synchronize the flow of authorizations during the workflow
execution is an important criterion when context changes as they do in modern
workflow. For this reason, WAM is not adequate to support workflow security.
Take for example the scenario of privileges which will be granted/revoked to/from
the flow according to the events generated during the execution of an activity. In
WAM the focus is only on the authorisation in an activity’s state and primitives,
but not in resource accesses. Whilst WAM can deal with Authorisation properties
and that MLS handles Integrity properties within the task dependencies, neither
can handle the security property of Availability. WAM was also extended in [67]
and SecureFlow was proposed. Specifying authorisation constraints for role as-
signments was done using a simple 4GL language. No provision however is given
to support different workflow security constraints from build-time to run-time of a
workflow. Authorisation properties can be expressed but can not handle integrity
and availability properties.
2.5 Workflow Adaptability
Central to context-aware workflow is their ability to orchestrate their activities
and services according to user’s needs. The ability to do so in heterogeneous en-
vironments poses a great challenge [89,105]. There are various approaches to deal
with adaptability of workflows which can be classified as run-time, automated and
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instance-based. In [135], a review focusing on the various adaptation approaches
in context-aware workflows and has identified various characteristics shared by
these approaches. Based on [61, 105], adaptation strategies for context-aware
workflows are classified into reactive and predictive classes. The former occurs
when an event has been triggered from the sensed context indicating the need for
adaptation for the task(s) that is to be executed. This has a fundamental limita-
tion as it does not take into account time-critical tasks. The later analyses early
the effect of adaptation in advance. This in turns require the existence of a static
adaptation plan which limits itself only to static environments. However, none of
them deal with adaptation at a secure context and time-critical activities. Another
important issue is that there is no workflow language available for the specifica-
tion, modelling and designing context-aware workflow which takes into account
security, timing and adaptability issues, [40, 134, 147]. Although context adapta-
tion can be considered as the exception to the normal workflow and hence may
be handled through database triggers and even-condition-action rules, [33, 147],
our central philosophy here is that context-awareness, timing and security issues
are the norm in workflow systems in real environments which are becoming more
pervasive and complex. In what follows we review some of the early attempts in
adaptation.
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Existing Techniques. In [81], an extension to BPEL workflows is proposed to
support policies to look up, select and bind partner services which are compliant
with a port type that is defined within an activity in a workflow definition. Such a
find-and-bind approach is not context-based neither compositional. In [37], BPEL
was extended to allow adaptation of interfaces to human operators. The approach
and its accompanied architecture (known as PerCollab) is still design-time, man-
ual and evolutionary; it differs from approaches such as those in [5, 49] due to
its purely vertical, refinement-based nature. Similarly, the work in [149] sup-
ports adaptation in declarative terms, focusing on various notions of inheritance:
Four types of inheritance (projection, protocol, projection/protocol, life-cycle),
are defined, corresponding to a set of rules to inheritance-preserving and trans-
formation rules, and a verification process. Again, these notions of inheritance
are rather vertical in nature. In [93], the authors adopt an approach based on the
run-time modification of process instances by means of constraints on changes
over code, which can be both of a mandatory and soft nature. Such constraints
are expressed using a declarative language ConDec, whose semantics are given
in a specification-oriented style where the underlying logic is a variant of linear
temporal logic, and working on an automata representation of workflows. The
approach, as such, is run-time and instance-based. In [94], a minimal set of rules
is used in order to enforce changes in workflow instances. Such rules are based
on the idea of refining the running code with specific instances. The design of
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these rules are such that it is possible to formally guarantee that the adapted work-
flows are persistently consistent and correct. The approach is not tailored to a
specific work-flow language, but it is defined on a generic formal model of work-
flow. In [125], the focus is focused on a suitable subset of the BPEL language. In
both cases, the approach is run-time and instance-based. However, the approach
lacks the ability to change policies according to change in contexts. In the WS-
Diamond project, [1,12,13], the focus was to establish a methodology for defining
distributed self-healing applications. With this aim, they focus on issues
• dealing with diagnosability and reparability testing of workflows; and
• , more relevant in our context, regards the enactment of self-healing mech-
anisms.
In this sense, an architecture was proposed which
• enriches the run-time support for the sake of diagnosing and fault repairing,
• in order to enact self-healing of process instances, and also
• to guarantee that certain QoS criteria are obeyed.
The work is rather at an infrastructural level, and concerns adapting single run-
time workflow instances. In [48] an approach was given which relies on defining
a set of test suit, for each service which is then used to monitor runtime deviations
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from expected behaviours [50]. An architecture was proposed, if a deviation from
an expected behaviour is discovered. The architecture tries to synthesize models
(automatically) that approximates the interaction protocols, and steer client-side
adaptations at runtime. The effectiveness of the approach is strongly dependent
on
• the exhaustiveness of the test suite which is often provided by the user; and
• that the synthesis engine is rather expressive and hence its performance is
acceptable.
This approach is categorized as run-time, instance-based, and (partially) auto-
mated. Predicting and learning the nature and types of faults given the history of
a service usage (which is a classic engineering principle), in order to be able to
repair them accordingly, is considered and dealt with in [116]. The ideas based
on the observation that the process of the repair is often related to the type and the
nature of the fault that caused the error. A repair strategy can be then constructed
from analysing
• the temporal behaviour of the fault; and
• substitution is applied if the fault is transient but permanent, yet a retry is
performed if the fault is transient but intermittent. The retry period will have
to be calculated dynamically.
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Learning strategies for fault repairs and the automatic selection an appropriate ac-
tion for repairs is performed incrementally. The learning process are based on a
Bayesian classification of faults; namely, permanent, intermittent and transient.
The approach is fully automated, and operates on run-time instances of activi-
ties. The learning knowledge of repairs increases and indeed its decision making
improves as more faults are repaired. In [56], the problem of run-time adapta-
tion of a composition of services based on the evaluation of Quality of Service
(QoS) in terms of expiration times was tackled. The approach is based on view-
ing processes as atomic entities, and considers adaptation as a reconfiguration of
such entities. In [55], a similar approach is taken, considering a more general
view of QoS in terms of information flow, but incurring higher overhead times
when computing the runtime reconfiguration of services. In [36], a staged archi-
tecture that supports the adaptive composition and execution of services, named
A-WSCE, is presented. The platform stands on top of the Synthy tool that al-
lowed it to provide automated composition functionalities. The key idea in [36]
is that of realizing a functionality by means of multiple, diverse compositions,
and then selecting at run-time one of the available compositions, considering dif-
ferent QoS metrics and possibly replacing elements should run-time faults take
place. The approach is embedded in an end-to-end approach that covers all the
phases, from service composition to deployment and execution, and it is fully
automated. Furthermore, in [106], the focus is on runtime adaptation based on
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non-functional QOS measures. Specifically, the authors considered a composi-
tion of services, whose non-functional requirements can be adapted by modifying
non-functional features of the component services. This is performed at run-time,
based on an aspect-oriented approach that allows the decoupling of adaptation
concerns with those of the business logics. There are approaches that, while still
related to (built-in) adaptation, take different views and focus on different, and
sometimes specific, issues. In the [91] approach, the focus is rather on guarantee-
ing the soundness, based on well-founded semantics, of adaptive workflows in-
side some given workflow management system. To achieve this, the authors inject
workflows with semantic constraints of specific forms, facilitating the way to their
formal verification, both considering run-time instances and adapted schemata of
workflows. In [136], the focus is to guarantee the alignment between adaptable
process schemata and their run-time instances. In particular, changes to a schema
must reflect to the process instances, and because of misalignments, conflicts of
various kinds may arise. The work identifies methods to identify such conflicts,
based on execution equivalence and structural comparison. In [128], the idea is to
support a specific form of protocol adaptation that takes place prior to deployment,
and serves to adapt interacting services in such a way that the protocol constrains
provided by a provider are obeyed by its users. This is performed by suitably
abstracting away from the definition of protocol details prior to runtime, and then
selecting an appropriate instantiation of actions at runtime, also based on a shared
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semantics. This means that a fairly rich service description must be given, in-
cluding roles, abstract and associated concrete protocol actions, and semantics.
For this purpose, the authors devised a specific “Very Simple Choreography Lan-
guage” (VSCL) language which embodies these elements. Similarly, in [29], an
automated approach is proposed to analyze protocol mismatches, and generate
adapters between services, expressed in BPEL. The whole process takes place at
design time, and integrates an automated verification step to identify the presence
of deadlock situations. As such, the approach does not lead to an adaptable code,
but performs a unique adaptation prior to deploy time. In [104], a conceptually
similar approach is taken, but using a more thorough analysis technique and there-
fore resolving, by means of a tree representing possible ordering mismatches, also
deadlock cases.
2.6 Contexts: Modelling and Management
Fundamental to the current work is the fact that workflows are both security-
critical and context-aware. We have thus far reviewed general principles of work-
flow systems, security requirements and what remains is to identify how mod-
ern workflow systems are context-aware. This section is devoted to this topic.
The continual advances and growth in smart devices such as laptops, PDAs and
smart phones with various processors and operating variety of sophisticated in-
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frastructure,mobile computing has attracted variety of applications such as (mod-
ern) workflow systems. Activities within a workflow system may be executed on
variety of these devices, each may be supported by different platforms. Activities
can be executed and performed on, for example, one PDA in one instant but on
a different device on another. Thus, in an attempt to move beyond the classic/-
traditional view of explicit usage of computers and terminal devices, a new, yet
general paradigm of user-centric mobility has been introduced in [146]. In this
paradigm, smart and autonomous computing technologies are embedded in ev-
ery device to enhance the use of computers and make them invisible to the users.
In such paradigm, emphasis is on mobile data access, smart spaces and context
awareness. Unlike tradition paradigms, where the majority of applications are
transformational (in the sense that they rely on user input), the new paradigm
relies on implicit information that can be deduced from (sometimes incomplete)
description of the environment which in turns change rapidly. Hence "context”
plays a vital role. Context in this rather ubiquitous environment refers to any
information that can be used to identify and characterise an activity. Take for ex-
ample a (traditional) home environments, the information about user’s position is
a context, and the times s/he is anywhere in the home are another contexts. These
context information can be then used as transition constraint for an appropriate
service selection and execution in workflows within ubiquitous environment [38].
In the literature, (e.g. [27,42,144,148], there have been different definitions of the
67 Chapter 2. Review
term context: Contexts can describe situations, Day [42] has elaborated on this
view and said:
Any Information that can be used to characterise the situation of an
entity. An entity is a person, a place, or a physical or computational
object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user
and an application, including the user and application themselves.
[42]
Contexts can also be defined as meta-information to characterise the specific sit-
uation of an entity and to describe a group of conceptual entities [27]. However,
the use of open-ended phrases such as "any information” or "characterise”, render
context to be so broad that it can cover everything. Winograd [148] has argued
that there is a distinction between context and environment.
...context depends on the interpretation of the operations involved on
an entity at a particular time and space rather than the inherent char-
acteristics of the entity itself. [148]
Context awareness is thus the ability for a software system to acquire, manage,
interpret and respond to context and thus to provide appropriate services to the
changing situation. In our view, a context instance is a set of values that describes
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the states and relations of an entity at a specific point of time and which con-
form to a certain context type. For example, John, who is a Person, has context
information that could be described as:
John: Person
Latitude ="45.87695”
Longitude = "-3.298875”
IsInvolvedIn = "Reading”
SitsBesides = "Alan”
One of the key issues with context awareness is how context information can be
acquired from different sources (e.g. users, device, and environment), represented,
managed and be integrated to be used adequately by a workflow applications.
Within workflow systems, context plays an important role. Adequate informa-
tion about available contexts, the underlying WfMS is able to determine the most
appropriate context to execute an activity. For example, knowing the contextual
information about "John”, we may choose "Alan” to perform the activity instead
of "John”.
2.7 Calculi for Context-Aware Systems
With the advent of context-aware systems, the need has grown to establish for-
mal basis that underpins their development. As a result, various calculi have been
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put forward and even a Grand Challenge initiative on Ubiquitous Computing, [4],
have been established in the U.K. to address this need. Various attempts have
been made to model workflow using the Activity diagram of UML [26] and vari-
ants of Petri net (for example see [142, 143] are used to provide a formal under-
pinnings. These variants extend the original Petri net with time, data and hier-
archy. In [142], coloured tokens (to model data) and timing intervals associated
to transitions (modelling duration of transitions) were added to the original Petri
net. However a fundamental limitation of these attempts is their inability to model
context and that workflows systems are treated as closed rather than open systems.
Another formal modelling technique is Harel’s Statemate Statecharts [52–54]. In
Statechart however, data is updated by the system itself and not by the environ-
ment, and they share the same limitation as Petri net in dealing with context.
Milner has proposed the concept of bigraph, [96] which is a special type of graphs
in which both communication amongst its node as well as their spatial config-
uration can be uniformally modelled. Nodes in a bigraph are permitted to be
nested within each other to form nodes with more complex structure. Milner
[78, 83, 96] has extended the bigraph model and introduced bigraphical reac-
tive systems (BRSs) as a unifying framework for designing models of concur-
rent and mobile systems. In this model, reactive systems are represented as a
set of rewriting rules together with an initial bigraph on which the rules oper-
ate. Plato-graphical models was introduced by Birkedal, et al., [25], as an attempt
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to model context-aware systems. Their attempt to use BRS was concluded that
BRSs are not suitable for directly modelling context queries. Context-awareness
calculus was proposed by Zimmer [152]. Contexts in the calculus have a hierar-
chical structure similar to the one proposed in mobile ambients [32]. Further, the
multi-agent synchronisation mechanism was adopted from the join-calculus. The
Context-awareness calculus was further extended by Bucur and Nielson, in [30].
In this extension, ambients are able to publish context information with the context
hierarchy. Context capabilities are modelled by named macros that capture pri-
mary context information. Further, in [47], a Calculus for Context Aware (CCA)
was presented in which context are also structured and introduced the notion of
context-guard which is used to manipulate and operate on context. Mobility is
also modelled as ambient (similar to that in Mobile Ambient (MA) [32]). CCA is
close to the work presented here, although our CS−F low enjoys other features
such as timing, schedulability, priorities and non-determinism. We shall return to
CCA in Chapter(4) (on page 119).
Based on UNITY, Roman et. al. [126] presented another formal model, known
as Context UNITY, in which aspects of context-aware computation can be ex-
pressed. In Context UNITY, context information are provided through exposed
variables and existential quantification is used for context discovery. This is sim-
ilar to our frame in CS−F low (see Chapter(3). Furthermore, abstract data types
were used to explicitly model contexts in CommUnity by Lopes and Fiadeiro [90].
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They use four special observables, similar to exposed variables and frame found
in [126], to provide context information on the entire system. Moreover, within
a mobile university campus environment, Bouzeghoub et. al. [28] has proposed
a model that performs situation-aware adaptive recommendation of information.
Ontologically-based frameworks have also been used to model context, see for
example [28, 39, 69, 118, 145].
2.8 Summary
In this chapter we gave a general overview of workflows and their importance in
everyday businesses and enterprises. Often, workflows are conflated with business
processes; throughout this thesis we take the view that both are identical unless we
explicitly state the difference. There are two major concerns in current workflow
system development. The first is security considerations and the second is con-
text awareness. Modern workflow systems cross the boundaries of organisations,
each has its own security requirements, policies and constraints. Even within one
organisation, activities in a workflow systems may be executed, in one of its in-
stances, within a platform but in another instance it may be executed or performed
on a different platform with completely different environment. Indeed it may not
even be automated. we have reviewed in some details Workflow Management
Systems together with the associated Workflow Reference Model which is a de
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facto standard produced by the Workflow Management Coalition (WfMC). We
have also reviewed basic security requirements for workflow systems and it was
clear that current Workflow Management Systems do not adequately deal with
these requirements in the presence of contexts which change constantly.
In addition, within a highly dynamical environment, the notion of adaptability
plays a central role in the design and implementation of workflow systems. There
are various approaches to deal with adaptability of workflows which can be classi-
fied as run-time, automated and instance-based. However, none of them deal with
adaptation at a secure context level.
Chapter 3
CS−F low
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL –
Linguistic Support
Objectives
• Describe the computational model for a context-aware and secure workflow sys-
tems.
• Details of the language CS−F low.
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3.1 Introduction
As we have articulated in the last chapter, modern workflow systems are highly
distributed and cross the boundaries of many enterprises. Take for example the
situation in which we wish to purchase a product from Amazon.com. The pur-
chase order follows a complicated workflow that crosses the boundaries of many
organisations/enterprises such as
• Suppliers
• storage warehouses,
• Financial organisations,
• Transport/Haulage companies,
• Legal agencies,
• Insurance companies, etc.
Each will need to access information that, in many cases, are private: name, ad-
dress, bank details, credit history, etc.
To deal with these security and privacy issues, the operations and codes of conduct
in each of these enterprises should (and normally is) governed by set of regulations
and policies that restrict access and limit the manipulation of their "trusted”, "con-
fidential” and "sensitive” information and/or local resources. In addition, within
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each of these organisations, the activities may be executed/performed on different
devices, agents and may be supported by different computational platforms/in-
frastructures.
Additionally, we have also discussed that workflows are intrinsically context-
aware and should be able to interact seamlessly and unobtrusively with its sur-
rounding. For example, in a warehouse situation, context requirement is location
– it is required not in absolute values, but as relations between relevant humans and
objects (for example, is a qualified worker (e.g strength) in the range of a box that
needs to be transported?). Further, the interaction between humans and objects
(for example, picking up a crate or putting down a crate) is equally important.
Also, individual constraints of the objects (for example, maximum transportable
weight and/or special storage requirements) of the involved entities have to be
considered, etc.
Designers should therefore be able to define/specify constraints based on the con-
text that the workflow perceives during its execution. This ability to change con-
straints/policies that characterise contexts, and hence security requirements, is im-
portant in order to increase our trustworthiness in the system.
This Chapter gives a detail description of the Computation Model, Section(3.2),
for our Secure and Context-Aware Workflows. It also presents our design lan-
guage CS−F low. The language has both graphical (Section (3.3)) and textual
(Section(3.4)) representations. The former is brief with the sole purpose of clar-
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ifying the ideas. The later presentation takes a usual and formal linguistic ap-
proach. The chapter ends with few examples of some of the common models,
Section(3.5). The underpinning formal semantics of the language will be given in
the next Chapter.
3.2 The Model
Fundamental to our design philosophy is that the computational model has context
as a first class citizen which has a
• name to identify (model) its location and
• frame to identify all observable attributes of interest.
Another important consideration is the ability to express security (e.g. access con-
trol) and context requirements, in a unified fashion using the same mechanism and
constructs.
It is also recognised that real-time is an important feature of workflow systems.
From deadlines, and worst case execution times to delays and interrupts. We have
carefully considered all these features and their associated specific constructs and
have made the appropriate provisions. Furthermore, in dealing with real-time
activities, our model should not make any of the usual simplified assumptions
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which are commonly used with real-time formalisms. For example, the maximal
parallelism hypothesis (i.e., the availability of an infinite number of resources),
[129], and the instantaneous communication assumption [101, 132]. Further, the
underlying design principles of any language must be
• richness, yet simplicity,
• practicality,
• support of modularity and, importantly
• formal underpinning (i.e. formal semantics).
To this end, our model has three distinct components: Context, Activity and
Guard.
3.2.1 Context
As we mentioned earlier that context plays an important part in the operational
behaviour(s) of modern workflows. Existing modelling techniques assume a cen-
tralised execution infrastructure. Therefore, one of the many challenges is to de-
sign workflow system to be executed in pervasive environments. This requires the
provision for a computational model in which context is made first class citizen
and that each of these contexts has its own security policies that constrain its be-
haviours - from access control to privacy and confidentiality provisions. Such a
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computation model has to treat both constraints (security and context) in a uniform
and integrated fashion.
Contexts can take a variety of forms: different platforms and operating systems,
hand-held devices, web-services, etc. A context is characterised by, what we call
context frame, which is a set of variables (or attributes) of interests. For example,
attributes of interests of a context such as a PDA could be its processor speed,
memory size and battery life time. On the other hand attributes such as age, qual-
ification and work experience will be of interest in the case of a human context;
yet body temperature, blood pressure and kidney functions are attributes more ap-
propriate in the case of a hospital ward context.
In our model, these attributes are predicated upon to form a context guard – in
the case of context, so as a decision may be taken to execute an activity or choose
different but more suitable context, etc. In addition, they are also important as
mechanisms to express security policies and for the design of variety of enforce-
ment mechanisms of these policies that, for example controls access to sensitive
data/information. As we shall see later, these guards play important role in the
specification and design of context properties and security policy constraints.
An activity in our model does not exist in isolation. Indeed it requires a context
to house it. Activities within a workflow move into a context to be executed but
may choose to move out to another context in order to complete its functionality.
In this way, context can be nested in a larger context in a compositional fashion.
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In what follows, a detail of these components are given.
3.2.2 Activity
Our unit of computation in a workflow system is an activity which describes a
piece of work that contributes toward the accomplishment of a given (functional
and business) goal. Hence, an activity has
• a goal,
• an input,
• an output,
• performed in a particular order – e.g. in sequence/parallel/alternate with
others,
• associated with a particular context – Contexts can be an organisation, a
device, a service (e.g. web-based service) or a computational environment.,
• uses resources/information,
• may affect more than one organisation unit,
• creates some value for users. and
• properly terminates – in the same or in a different context.
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Central to an activity is a an activity frame. The frame is a set of variables, known
as context variables, which are allowed to change during the execution of the
activity. The context variables characterises the attributes of interest about the
context, e.g., location, time, temperature, etc.. Their changes are only observed
and then acted upon.
Normally, an activity starts, executes and then properly terminates within the
same context it started with. An activity starts in one context but may terminate
in a different context. This means that an activity has the ability to be mobile and
moves from one context to another. But as an activity in our model is tightly asso-
ciated with a context, mobility occurred at a context level, i.e. an activity moves
with its context. This is achieved by the execution of the context operation to α.
(I.e. moving out of the current context and/or moving into a new context, α).
In our model, activities may be composed concurrently to produce a new activity
which terminates if and only if all of its components terminate, i.e. we adopt the
distributed termination convention. Further, without loss of generality, we assume
a single clock for an instant of a workflow. Activities are also composed in alter-
ation and in a non-deterministic fashions. An activity can also be conditionally
executed after the passability of its condition or guard.
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3.2.3 Guards
Each activity/context is governed by a set of context and/or security policies/con-
straints which are continually changing due to either the occurrence of an event
and/or the passage of time.
Within workflow systems, access control policies play a fundamental role. Tradi-
tionally an access control policy is expressed in terms of (see, eg., [7, 17, 22, 73–
76]):
• subjects – such as human, activities, platforms. These need to be authenti-
cated before being allowed to access a resource (an object) – an object can
not be modified unless access right is granted.
• object. This is a resource which is there to be used. It has a state where a
subject can alter once it is granted to do so.
• action – is an activity where once the access is granted, it can be executed.
ECA is another formulation of policy which is discussed later on, see Section(3.5.7)
(page 115).
When designing a policy we inevitably think of the system in a specific context
and define the rules that restrict the system in this context. It is natural to define
policies with respect to their context and then compose the policies to yield the
overall system policy.
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Security policies are expressed within the body of the activity and their enforce-
ment can be part of the infrastructure of the activity itself or its context.
3.3 CS−F low: Graphical Representation
As a workflow is itself an activity, our presentation here makes no distinction be-
tween both. An activity exists within a context which has a name, a frame and an
activity that specifies its functionality. In this section we give a graphical repre-
sentation of our setting so as to increase clarity; however, a textual representation
will also be given in a later section.
Context_id : 〈Frame〉
Policies_Constraints
‖ Context_Constraints
‖ Behavioural_Description
where Frame is given as:
Frame :: 〈Context_Attributes〉
The classical notion of frame is that it contains variables that are allowed to change
during execution time. Context_Attributes are the same but are read by all activi-
ties/workflows in the system, changed by the environment and not by the activities
themselves. For example, sensors, clocks, etc.1.
1An empty frame is denoted by 〈 〉.
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Note here that context and security requirements are constraints that are executed
in parallel with the activity itself. The parallel construct here acts as the realisation
of enforcement. Context and security requirements themselves are rules that are
expressed as activities which constrain the functionalities of the workflow under
design. we shall elaborate on this later in this chapter.
Take for example, an activity, such as "Get Next Order” or "Track Progress”,
which may be executed on one of the PDA_1 devices whose context parameters
of interests might be: s (size), w (weight) and p (power_strength). The behaviours
(context and functional descriptions) are expressed by the set of policies given by
the processes PPDA1 and PDA1, respectively.)
This is represented graphically as follows:
PDA1 : 〈s,w,p〉
(PDA1(s,w, p) ‖ PPDA1(Ch,x,y,z))
The notion of a behaviour here is interesting. Traditionally a behaviour is often
defined as a sequence of states, as has been adopted within the logic-based for-
malisms, in particular, the temporal logic communities. However, in the process
algebraic setting, such as CSP [62] or CCS [60, 97, 98, 100, 130], behaviours are
formalised as a sequence of traces, specially communication traces. It all depends
on what we can observe and if we are dealing with open or closed systems. In
our case, being context-aware, it render itself to openness and so what we observe
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are important. So we adopt trace-base semantics of behaviours. Therefore, we
observe both types of traces: those which are constructed from context variables
and other traces from activities’ functional traces.
Within our setting, in which we have both states and context variables; both of
which determine behaviours of the whole workflow, the definition of a behaviour
may change.
Note that the state variables of interests are x,y,z.
If we consider, the worker Ali, carrying this PDA may be modelled as a parent
context, of which we are only interested in his location , l, and the time, t:
Ali : 〈loc, t〉
PDA1 : 〈s,w, p〉
(PDA1(s,w, p) ‖ PPDA1(Ch,x,y,z))
‖PAli
Here PAli is a process that describes the behaviour of Ali and whatever other de-
vices he may be carrying with him.
At the same time, there may be some more activities that are being performed on
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a different context, namely PDA10. This is represented as
PDA1 : 〈s,w,p〉
(PDA1(s,w, p) ‖ PPDA1(Ch,x,y,z))
‖
PDA10 : 〈s1,w1,p1〉
PDA10(s1,w1, p1)‖
PPDA10(Ch,a,b,c)
Note that a, b, c, x, y, , z and Ch are state variables describing the behaviour of
an activity.
Activities can communicate by exchanging messages over channels. The commu-
nication is synchronous and is modelled using handshake message passing com-
munication primitives: C ! v (output) and C ? x (input). For example, the processes
PPDA1 and PPDA10 may have the form: PPDA1 =̂ ...; Ch ! Tempvalue ; ...
and PPDA10 =̂ · · · ; Ch ? x ; · · · . Here we have PPDA1 is sending the value
Tempvalue to PPDA10 over the channel Ch, which stores it in its local state variable,
x.
As we mentioned earlier, mobility can be also modelled. An activity can start in
a context and then moves to be completed in another context using the operation
to (new_Context).
For example, in a typical warehouse, Warehouse, we may have three mobile de-
vices inside its building: PDA1, PDA10 and PDA3. Also we may have a Van that is
parked outside. On PDA_1 the activity, Q ; to (Van) ; R, starts with the process
Q then followed by to (Van). This indicates that the activity has to complete (by
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performing the process R in a different context Van. This is modelled as:
Warehouse
PDA1
Q ; to (Van) ; R
‖
PDA10
‖
PDA3
‖
Van
Laptop2
‖
PDA31
After an execution step, we have
Warehouse
PDA10
‖
PDA3
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‖
Van
PDA1
R
‖
Laptop2
‖
PDA31
It is important to note that PDA1 still carries with it its side of channel Ch and
may still continue to communicate with PDA10.
3.4 CS−F low: Textual Representation
Our computational model is supported by a design language, known as Context,Secure-
Flow (CS−F low), with which we are able to design and analyse workflows. Ta-
ble 4.1 depicts the syntax of CS−F low based on two syntactic categories: ac-
tivities (denoted by P or Q) and guards (denoted by G1 or G2). We assume a
countable-infinite set of names which are written in lower-case letters, e.g. x and
y. Let any denotes an unspecified value. This is used in communicating signals
amongst activities and/or context. We let b to denote Boolean variables and y˜ to
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denote a list of names. As it is customary we use ˜ to denote a set, i.e., y˜ denotes
a set of names where it is appropriate. We reserve t to represent time, such that
t ∈ N and that tα and tβ denotes the start and termination time of an activity,
such that tα ≤ tβ I.e. the termination time of an activity will be at, or after its
release time. We also use the names α,β,γ, . . . to identify contexts.
Table 3.1 – Syntax of CS−F low
P,Q ::= skip | abort | x := v | delay(t) | [t1 . . . tn] P | c ! v | c ? x
| α 〈x˜〉 : {P} | to(α) | var x˜ in P {Q} | chan c˜ in P {Q}
| in α · P(x˜) | P ; Q | P ‖ Q | P .Gt Q | while G · do P od
| [p1] : G1→ P 2 [p2] : G2→ Q
G ::= true | b | not G | G1 and G2 | somewhere(α) · G
The informal semantics of these constructs are as follows.
3.4.1 Contexts.
The context
α 〈x˜〉 :
{
P
}
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has a name, α, a frame 〈x˜〉 and its behaviour is described by the activity P. 2 For
example, the context
Ikea : 〈 〉
{
PIkea | PDA23 : {Q }
}
describes a context Ikea which has no frame, whose behaviour is described by
PIkea and has a sub-context, PDA23. The behaviour of this sub-activity is described
by the process Q. A Context may have a frame that contains a set of variables of
interests which can be captured, by existing sensors and sampled, then are acted
upon. These are "read-only” variables. For example in Ikea warehouse,we may
have DampLevel (monitoring the moisture in the air) and SmokeAlarm (monitoring
fire). We can express this as:
Ikea : 〈DampLevel,SmokeAlarm〉
{
PIkea | PDA23 : {Q}
}
The operation, to(β) allows context to move out to another context, β. For exam-
ple, Ikea above can take the form:
Ikea : 〈DampLevel,SmokeAlarm〉
2In process calculi, this is known as restriction, i.e. declaring variables that are only used by
the activity/context.
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{
PIkea ‖ PDA23 :
{
TakeStock ;
not (DampLevel ≥ 25 ∨ SmokeAlarm) →
to(Van) ; Place Order
}
}
Unless DampLevel ≥ 25 or SmokeAlarm has set off, the worker on PDA23 will
place an order (i.e. perform PlaceOrder) for whatever stock(s) s/he has recorded
(ie. after performing the workflow TakeStock). Otherwise, s/he has to complete
stock taking before moving to the context known as Van.
Important to note the use of the BOOLEAN guard as a context expression. As we
said earlier on that guards in CS−F low play important role as they are used
to constrain contexts as well as to describe security policies. We shall further
elaborate on this in subsequent sections.
3.4.2 Activities.
There are primitives and compound activities.
Primitive Activities.
• x := v
describes an activity that assigns the value v to a variable x. Once it is com-
pleted, it terminates immediately. In this setting we assume no consumption
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of time during the assignment. If it does, we shall make this explicit using
delays as appropriate.
• delay(t)
is an activity that delays a workflow by a duration of t time.
• skip
is the null activity. It is an activity that does not do anything and terminates
immediately.
• abort
is deadlock activity. It may be doing things but we can not observe it. It does
not terminate. Such an activity should be avoided at all cost. In refinement
calculi, rules are often formulated to avoid the refinement of the design to
such activity .
• [t1 · · · tn]P
describes an activity P that will take either t1, t2, or tn time units. If n = 1,
the activity will take exactly a t time. 3 This is a powerful construct as it pro-
3Sometimes, we write [S]P, where S is a set {t1 · · · tn}. Also as a shorthand we use:
deadline(n) P
to denote an activity with n as a specific deadline. This deadline representation is known as
"hard” deadline, in the sense that the activity must successfully complete after n time unites. It is
considered to be a timing failure if it completes either on n−1 or n+1 time unites.
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vides a greater flexibility at execution time of a workflow. At run time, the
scheduler (a component that is responsible for scheduling activities given
various platforms and contexts) will have the choice between the various
deadlines which will depend on the available resources.
• c ! v and c ? x
describes how activities are communicating with each others: c !v is an
activity that send the value v over the channel c; whilst c ? x describes an
activity that receives a value over a channel c and stores it in x.
c ! any and c ? any represent activities which exchange "signals”, i.e the
communicated value over channel c is irrelevant.
• var x˜ in P { Q } and chan c˜ in P { Q }
These activities, respectively, are used to declare/introduce set of state vari-
ables and set of channels used by the activity P and whose behaviour is
described by the activity Q.
• α 〈x˜〉 : {P}
This declares a context α which has a frame x˜, of observable attributes of
interests, and whose behaviours are described by the activity P.
• to(α)
This models mobility. Upon execution, the current activity is moved to
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another context α.
• in α · P(x˜)
This represents a "calling” activity: In the context α there is an activity, P,
that is to be executed but with the "actual” parameters x˜. It is expected that
within the context α there is an activity of the form var z˜ in P {·}. Here z˜
is a list of P′s formal parameters. The body of P contains its implementa-
tion within its context. In a different context there may be different imple-
mentation. The implementation of P is completely hidden from the calling
activity. In a process algebraic term, this represents process abstraction.
Compound Activities.
• P ; Q.
It is an activity which starts with a sub-activity P and upon its proper ter-
mination, the sub-activity Q begins. Here we assume that the sequential
composition is instantaneous. However, to model time consumption, we
may utilise the delay activity delay(t).
• P ‖ Q.
This the parallel composition activity. The activities P and Q execute con-
currently and the whole activity terminates if and only if both sub-activities
terminate. In another words, we adopt distributed termination convention.
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• while G : do P od.
This describe an activity in which P repeats itself as long as G holds. G
contains no communication activity.
• P .Gt Q4.
This is an activity that starts with the activity P. Then Q starts (from its
initial state) if either a t time units has elapsed or an event has occurred
(that made the guard G to evaluate to true) whichever happens first. The t
and G are optional:
– P . Q.
This is an activity which is equivalent to P.
– P .G Q.
This is an activity which starts with P and only if an event G occurs
then Q takes over, i.e it acts as an interrupt.
– P .t Q.
Here the activity starts with P and after a t time units elapsed activity
Q starts. Notice here that t is not related to the execution time of P.
For example, if t = 0 then P .0 Q is equivalent to Q. However, if t
is greater than the execution time of P, then its termination has to be
delayed until t elapsed, then Q starts.
4Sometimes, we use the term signal to refer to this construct.
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• [p1] : G1 → P2 [p2] : G2 → Q.
This activity is to model choice. The guards G1 and G2 are Boolean
expressions which are evaluated at the start of the activity. p1 and p2 and
integer values represents priority. We adopt the convention that p1 is of
higher priority than p2 if p1 〈 p2. If both guards are evaluated to false, the
whole activity fails and progress is not made until one of the guards is
passable.
If p1 = p2, then the activity models non-deterministic choice. In such a
case, if both guards are evaluated to true, then one of the associated
sub-activities is chosen at random and executed and then the whole activity
properly terminates. None of the Gi contain communication activity. 5
3.4.3 Guards
As we mention earlier, guards allow us to describe properties of contexts, similar
to that adopted in CCA [47], as well as access control security policies’ condi-
tions. In addition to the usual propositional operators such as negation (not) and
conjunction (and):
5The priorities here are fixed at design stage. However, we can enrich this prioritise choice by
allowing priorities to change dynamically: For example, the activity
[p1(i)] : G1 → P 2 [p2(i)] : G2 → Q changes its priorities according to the value of an integer
variable i.
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• true always holds.
• b Boolean variable.
• somewhere(α) ·G is a spatial modal operator that hold if there exists (at
least one) a sub-context in which G holds. 6
Some derived guards can be defined in Table(3.2).
Table 3.2 – Derived connectives
false =̂ not true
b1 or b2 =̂ not(not b1) and (not b2)
b1 implies b2 =̂ (not b1) or b2
b1 equivalent b2 =̂ (b1 implies b2) and (b2 implies b1)
3.4.4 Postscript
In this postscript, we point out a number of important considerations that need to
be adhered to in any CS−F low design system. These are:
6Note that the duality of this guard, i.e. everywhere(α) ·G which holds if G hold everywhere
within the context α can also be defined: everywhere(α) ·G =̂ not somewhere(α) ·not G
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1. Characteristics.
Our design of CS−F low stems for the desire and the need for a workflow
design language that has the provisions for modelling
• concurrency;
• real-time constraints;
• context-awareness
• mobility and
• access control security policies
in a uniform and modular fashion. CS−F low achieves all of these unlike
existing frameworks and languages. Process calculi such as CSP [62], CCS
[95, 97, 99] and their variations are adequate to model concurrency, and
some of their variations have the ability to model real-time systems [41,
124, 132]. However, they lack features to model context and security. The
pi-Calculus [97] and [130] and the recent bigraphs [25,78,83,96] and CCA
[47], were designed specifically for context and mobility but also lack real-
time and security provision. Our recent development of S-Flow [10, 11]
attempted to achieve this but context was not first class citizen and rather
implicit. The language was complex as it has a sub-language that deals
with security policies. The novelty of CS−F low is that it has features
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that allows the modelling of all of the above and that policies are elegantly
expressed using guards which can also be used to express constraints on
contexts.
2. Design Faults. Here we highlight few types of faults to avoid when using
CS−F low to design systems.
(a) The synchronisation Model. The tight synchronisation model that
we have adopted will require care in the design so as to avoid com-
munication deadlock and other design faults. For example an activity
such as
(3.1) Ward : 〈light, temp〉

· · ·
‖ · · ·
‖ c1 ! v ; c ? x
‖ c ! v1 ; c1 ? y
‖ · · ·
‖ · · ·

Obviously this design is fatally wrong as its realisation will lead to
deadlock. This pattern may occur in various forms, the most difficult
of which is if the communication appears in conditional such as the
following:
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(3.2) Ward : 〈light, temp〉

· · · ‖
· · ·
G1 → P 2 G2 → Q
· · · ‖
G11 → P1 2 G21 → Q1
· · ·
· · ·

where
P =̂ c ! v
P1 =̂ c1 ? x1
Q =̂ c ! v
Q1 =̂ c1 ! x1
This will be hard to analyse for it involves non-deterministic choice.
Whilst we are discussing a design principle in which, at the analysis
phase, we require to partition a given workflow into a sequence of
atomic activities, a design such as the above will be fatally flaw and
will not render to such analysis.
It should be noted that such a drawback is not in CS−F low but rather
inherent in synchronous communications.
(b) Guards Passability. In the construct, [p1] : G1 → P 2 [p2] : G2 →
Q, when priorities are equal (i.e. p1 = p2, the choice becomes non-
deterministic. This provides extra freedom in the design phase. How-
ever care must be taken to achieve (a) fairness and (b) avoid failure.
Fairness in the sense that if both guards are passable every time, then
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we should avoid choosing the same one. On the other hand, We should
avoid a design that leads to the abort activity which will result in the
case where both guards are not passable.
(c) Scoping and Communication. As we mentioned earlier that commu-
nication in CS−F low is via message passing using channels and it
is synchronous. The two communicating activities declare the chan-
nel(s) that are linked two. The sending activity pushes the commu-
nicated value in the channel and the receiving activity pulls the value
and place it in a variable that is local to it. However, let us consider a
model such as
(3.3) chan c , var x in { c ! v ‖ c ? x ‖ P(x) }
This is a perfectly "legal” expression but a closer look reveals a flaw
in the model as the variable declaration of x has a wider scope than
intended. This will lead to undesirable behaviour. The intuition is that
the receiving activity, receives the value in a variable local to it. This
model can be rewritten as
(3.4) chan c in { c ! v ‖ (var x in{c ? x })‖ P(x) }
Here the x in P(x) is different from the x used in the receiving activity.
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3. Context, Location and Holes.
Central to our model is that activities do not operate in the ether. They need
contexts which identify their locations and within which they execute, ter-
minate and may move out of them to another contexts. Unlike formalisms
such as CCA [47], the notion of holes exists in which processes can move
to. This makes the models rather clumsy and static with a fixed number of
holes.
The term "context” is used here instead of "location” for the later can in-
dicate/require notions such as Proximity, Coordinates, Neighborhoods, etc.
which in our view adds extra complication which is not needed.
In our CS−F low, two special contexts, which we call SKIP and STOP
The former is an empty context and nothing is happening in it and there
are no observables. The later is the most un-inhabited context and will
remain so forever! Further, if it moves into another context, it makes the
host context un-inhabitable too. It is a context that needs to be avoided
at all cost. Context, like activities, can communicate synchronously via
channels. Whenever a context moves, its channels move with it. This is a
powerful mobility notion as all what we needed is a single label to identify
a context. The connectivity’s between contexts (or their exact coordinates,
neighborhoods, etc.) becomes irrelevant.
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4. Nondeterminism and Fairness
There are various types of nondeterminism:
• don’t care nondeterminism where the decision is made, when encoun-
tered, in an arbitrary way (unless fairness assumption is made. Cor-
rectness here is taken if every computation must succeed. Particularly,
to be considered a terminating program if every computation (from an
admissible initial state) of that program must terminate.
• don’t know nondeterminism, where correctness is defined existentially.
Program succeeds if at least one of its computation terminates.
In CS−F low we adopt the former.The issue of fairness is beyond the scope
of this study and is left for future work.
3.5 Examples
This section is devoted to provide few simple but illustrative examples of CS−F low
designs to some of the frequently occurring situations in workflows. From time-
dependent issues to policies (both context- and security-related) structures. Some
of these will be utilised in our evaluation case study.
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3.5.1 Buffers
In this section we consider the design of buffers: one-place buffer that does not
remember its contents once it is pulled out and another keeps a copy of the item
that is deposited. The later is important in Context-aware applications.
1. One-place, memory-less Buffer. A one-place buffer is a classic data struc-
ture with two actions push (to place an item in the buffer) and pull (to remove an
item from the buffer). Being a one-placed, the buffer is considered to be full when
it contains one item and empty if it contains no item.
We assume that the buffer is empty to begin with (this a normal assumption). As
it is customary with buffers, we have two operations: push (to place an item in
the buffer) and pull (to remove an item from the buffer). The buffer behaves as
follows:
• Initially, the push operation is performed. This is permitted as the buffer is
empty.
• Alternate pull followed by a push are performed.
The application of the one-place buffer can be found in many situations, for ex-
ample, an account in a banking scenario. From the informal requirements of the
buffer, we can articulate a number of (security) policies governing each of the
buffer’s activities. These include
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1. removing an item from an empty buffer is not allowed; and
2. adding an item to a full buffer is not allowed
And in a situation where a role-based scenario is important, we may add
3. A buffer is initialised only by an authorised user.
The system is modelled as follows.
(3.5) Buffer =̂

push ? x ;
empty := false ;
while true
do
{
empty → push ? x ;
empty := false
2
not empty → pull ! v ;
empty := true
}
od

and
Authorised_User =̂ push ! v
User =̂ pull ? x ; push ! v
2. Buffers with memory The above buffer does not remember an item once it
is "pulled” out. Once it is taken out, the buffer does not have any record of it. In
typical context-aware applications users date/preferences and device profiles, for
example in Electronic Patient Records and smart devices. Data which are placed
in the buffer need to be kept and be kept "fresh”. Freshness here means being
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updated. The amount of data depends on the size of the buffer. In this example, we
still consider a one-place buffer but with memory. This type of buffer is sometimes
known as persistent Cell [47]. Such a buffer/cell can be modelled as follows.
(3.6) Buffer =̂

Buffer =̂
push ? x ;
current := x ;
empty := false ;
while true
do
{
empty → push ? x
current := x
2
not empty → pull ! current ;
empty := true
}
od

3.5.2 Adaptable activities
Consider a context-aware system which enables a mobile software agent to ed-
it/view a text file on any host device using an appropriate text editor for that
device’s operating system. This can be modelled in CS−F low using the con-
cept of activity abstraction. Suppose there are two types of devices in the system:
some running Windows operating systems and others running Linux. Each device
running Windows is configured to use notepad as a default text editor while de-
vices running Linux use emacs. Let’s use win and Linx to denote context running
Windows and Linux, respectively. Each of these contexts contains an activity ab-
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straction edit that maps to the default text editor and the mobile agent just has to
call that activity abstraction to edit a file using the local text editor as specified
below. Our ShopFloor is specified as a context which has two devices: win and
linx:
(3.7) SpF =̂
 ShopFloor :{
win ‖ linx
}

where the win context is specified as
(3.8) win =̂

win :
{
var f in edit
{
notepad(f )
}
}

And the Linux device is specified as
(3.9) linx =̂

linx :
{
var f in edit
{
emacs(f )
}
}

The employee/software agent may have the following specification
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(3.10) Employee =̂
 Employee :{
somewhere (ShopFloor) · edit(file)
}

If the host device is win then notepad will be used:
(3.11) win =̂

win :
{
var f in edit
{
notepad(f )
}
‖
Employee :
{
somewhere(ShopFloor) · edit(file)
}
}

Otherwise, emacs will be used
(3.12) linx =̂

linx :
{
var f in edit
{
emacs(f )
}
‖
Employee :
{
somewhere(ShopFloor) · edit(file)
}
}

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3.5.3 Periodic Activities
In many occasions, workflows may contain several periodic activities. For exam-
ple, in a context-aware hospital ward, patients are continually being monitored.
Once a status of a patient has changed, a red light flashes indicating the need for
measuring blood pressure at a regular interval and for a number of intervals. This
can be modelled in CS−F low as follows. Let T, D, and N denote a period,
deadline and number of periods respectively, and assume D ≤ T: Here we have
a Ward workflow with two context variables, light (which can either be flashing
or off) and temp. The following describes the situation, over a period of 12 hours,
patients are admitted until the light flashes, then blood pressure is periodically
monitored.
(3.13)
Ward =̂

Ward : 〈light, temp〉
{
· · · ‖
· · · ‖
AdmitAPatient .somewhere(Ward) · (light = flashing)12 MeasureBP
· · · ‖ · · ·
}

where
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(3.14) MeasureBP =̂

var T, D, N, i in
{
while i ≤ N
do
(
([T ]([D]TakeBloodPressure)
‖
delay(T)
)
i = i + 1
od}

where TakeBloodPressure is an activity that describes the flow of drug adminis-
tration.
3.5.4 AT M : Cash Withdrawal
To demonstrate the usage of guards, we consider the next generation of automatic
teller machines, AT M , whose purpose is to allow customers to perform the usual
various financial transactions (e.g., check balance, withdrawal of cash, change
PIN, etc.) but more securely. We model the AT M as a context which is com-
posed of various sub-contexts, namely, Transaction (performing the actual trans-
actions), Camera (which is integrated with the machine and automatically capture
image of users once they are cleared), a database manager (DBM) that manages all
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data (accounts, images, etc.) and an alarm, Alarm (which sounds when security is
breached). These contexts need to communicate together via a pre-defined chan-
nels. Connections are assumed to exist, for example, between Transaction and the
DBM, Police and TakeImage contexts. AT M has the following general structure:
(3.15)
AT M : 〈:〉

DBM : 〈ChipN,PINs, images〉{PDBM}
‖ Transactions : 〈names,ChipValid,PinNumber〉{PTransactions}
‖ TakeImage : 〈ChipN, images〉{PTakeImage}
‖ Police : 〈sound, images〉{PPolice}
‖ Alarm : 〈bell〉{PAlarm}

Where PX denotes a workflow that describes the behaviour of the context X. Here
we only give a detail of the activity Transactions. Let ReadChip be an activity that
enables the reading of the chip on a credit card and CheckPinNumber is another
activity that checks the validity of the Personal Identification Number (PIN). An
access control security role may be that a credit card must have a unique chip
number and only a correct PIN, that is associated with that number can perform
transactions.
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(3.16)
Transaction =̂

chan T DBM,TCus in

var ChipN,ChipValid,
PinNumber,ValidPin
while true
do
Continue := true;
while Continue
do
ReadChip;
TDBM ! ChipN
TDBM ? ChipValid
ChipValid → Continue := true
od
ValidPin := false;
counter := 1;
while counter ≤ 3 and not ValidPin
do
TCus ? PinNumber ;
CheckPinNumber(ValidPin) ;
ValidPin → Per f ormTransactions
2
not ValidPin →
counter = counter + 1
od
od


3.5.5 SWIFT-Cabs, Ltd.
SWIFT-Cabs, Ltd. is a local taxi firm whose headquarter (HQ) office is based
in Leicester City Centre. It serves local community within the city as well as
outside it including airports. Currently the firm has over 150 cars. This number is
changeable as cars can leave the firm and new ones join. Cars are privately owned
and once join the firm, an annual subscription fee has to be paid to the firm for its
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service, namely allocating customers. Currently they operate using phone lines.
Customers phone, or go to HQ, requesting a taxi. Customer are not aware of who
the drivers are. The HQ is responsible for finding an available taxi.
This scenario is used widely within Service-Oriented computing paradigm and is
known as Publish/subscribe protocol. It is an asynchronous messaging protocol.
It is well documented that asynchronous mode of communication can easily be
modelled by synchronous model by having a buffer between the sender and re-
ceiver. The buffer in this example is what is known as broker. In this scenario,
senders (publishers) send messages only to the applications that are interested in
receiving the messages (subscribers) without knowing their identities. The idea
here is that such a decoupling between publishers and subscribers enhances and
provides for greater scalability and a more dynamic network topology.
As we can see in our scenario of Swift-Cars Ltd: the HQ acts as the broker,
subscribers are the cars and customers are the publishers. A simplified publish/-
subscribe system can be modelled in CS−F low as follows: The publisher, the
broker and the subscribers can be modelled as three contexts named:
Customer,HQ,Car1,Car25,Car33, respectively:
113 Chapter 3. CS−F low Model
• Customer request a car from the HQ:
(3.17) Customer =̂

Customer : {while true
do
CustHQ ! ′pos′ ;
HQCust ? x
od }

• The HQ receives the request, identifies available cars and forwards them the request:
(3.18)
HQ =̂

HQ : {while true
do
CustHQ ? req ;
Identify appropriate cars ;
( HQCar1 ! ′loc′ ‖ HQCar33 ! ′loc′ ‖ HQCar25 ! ′loc′ ) ;
( delay (5) ‖
( true → .Car1HQ ? any HQCust ! time
2 true → .Car33HQ ? any HQCust ! time
2 true → .Car25HQ ? any HQCust ! time)
od }

• The Car contexts have similar structure. Here we give the specification of Car1:
(3.19) Car1 =̂

Car1 : {while true
do
HQCar1 ? x ;
Car1HQ ! any
od }

The whole system is modelled as
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(3.20) Swift−Cabs =̂

Customer
‖ HQ
‖ Car1
‖ Car33
‖ Car25

It is worth noting that the above model can be generalised by parameterising
Swift−Cabs with an integer variable NumCar which can be changed whenever a
car is added to the system.
3.5.6 Ikea’s shop floor
Let us consider the Ikea’s scenario, and let us assume that there are a number of
smoke alarms, each is within a sub-context of Ikea’s shop-floor. One in the toilet,
one in the children play area and another in the cashier area.
A desirable specification will be if all alarms have sounded then an evacuation
workflow should be applied. However, if one of the alarms has sounded then this
will cause the rest to sound and then the evacuation workflow is applied.
Ikea : 〈DampLevel,SmokeAlarm〉
{
PIkea ‖ PDA23 :
{
TakeStock
[0] everywhere(Ikea).SmokeAlarm → Evac
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2
[1] Somewhere(Ikea).SmokeAlarm →
(RaiseAllAlarms ; Evac)
2
[2]DampLevel ≥ 25 → ResitPressure
PlaceOrder
}
}
3.5.7 Policies
As we mentioned earlier that policies are expressed using the choice construct
where, in rule-based system, guards are used to express constraints (premise to,
e.g. control access), to an action (which is the corresponding activity). However,
in the event-condition-action (ECA in short) model, rules are used to model the
behaviours of context-aware applications. The general form of an ECA rule is:
ON event IF condition DO action
where
• event signals a change in the external environment,
• condition is a Boolean expression about the state of the system and
• action is a computation of some kind.
This rules simply says that when an even occurs and if the condition is passable
then the action is taken. In CS−F low, the general structure of ECA may take the
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form:
(3.21) ECA =̂

while true
do
{
Gevent1 and Gcondition1 → P
2
Gevent2 and Gcondition2 → Q
· · ·
2
}
od

Where
• Geventi is a context-expression about the external context of that activity;
• Gconditioni is a guard expression about that activity; and
• P, Q are activities.
The whole workflow system may have the general form:
System =̂
Flows ‖ EventAnalyser‖ECA
Flows describe one or more activities that form the workflow in hand. EventAnalyser,
receives an event and identifies the corresponding set of policies that need to be
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executed 7. EventAnalyser plays the role of Reference Monitor [11,73,75,76] that
often used to enforce policies.
3.6 Summary
This chapter starts from the realisation that modern workflow systems are (a)
highly distributed, (b) cross the boundaries of many enterprises. This makes cur-
rent workflow systems
• security-critical – as it may need to access data of various enterprises;
• context-aware – as activities may be adapted to conform with the context
that it occupies and
• some of their activities are inherently temporal with timing constraints.
In this chapter we have motivated the need for a novel design notation for work-
flow systems. Therefore any new notation/language has to enjoy the following
features:
• support concurrency;
• context and context awareness are first-class citizen;
7Construct, such as, the interrupt, P .Gt Q, can be utilised. Detail case study will be given in
subsequent Chapter.
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• supports mobility as activities can move from one context to another;
• has the ability to express timing constrains: delay, deadlines, priority and
schedulability;
• allows the expressibility of (access control) security policies without the
need for an extra linguistic complexities; and
• enjoy sound formal semantics that allows us to animate design and compare
various designs.
Further, current specification and design languages for these systems are not ade-
quate. As a response to these challenges, the chapter gives a novel computational
model for context and secure workflow systems. The unit of computation is an
activity which is a discrete unit, with input, output and satisfies a given business
goal. An activity needs a context to execute. This makes context first class citi-
zen. Context has a frame which has a set of observable attributes of interest: time,
location, temperature, etc. We have introduced a design language (CS−F low)
within which context and activity can be modelled. Constraints on contexts and
security policies can be expressed in a unified manner. However, it is important
to realise that activities can be long-running transactions and that they should be
designed to tolerate failures, whether, timing or functional failure. Issues such as
dealing with partial execution of a workflow before a fault occurs must be dealt
with at a design time. This issue will be treated in chapter 5.
Chapter 4
CS−F low
FORMAL SEMANTICS
and Algebraic Characterisation
Objectives
• Provide a formal semantics of CS−F low in CCA
• Give equational laws of CS−F low
• Present a timing characterisation of CS−F low
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4.1 Introduction
In order to add rigor to our CS−F low design language, we need to precisely de-
fine its formal semantics. This will add more confidence in the design and its use
by highlighting any errors and/or limitations.
The techniques of presenting a semantic definition of any language can be cate-
gorised under three major headings:
• Denotational approach [123,131,133,137,139,140] which assign each con-
struct/notation of the language to a value in a mathematical domain which
is understood independently such as, for example, a function or logical
formula that describes some kind of observation of the properties and be-
haviour of program when executed .
• Algebraic [31,59,60,108,109,115] style which does not explicitly say what
the program does but it can show, using equational reasoning, if two differ-
ently written programs are equivalent or not.
• Operational style [51, 100, 120] describes how a program can be executed
by a series of structured steps by some abstract mathematical machine.
The quest for the type of semantics we chose, we are guided (and minded) by the
requirements/desire to animate and analyse our designs. The type of semantics
we chose to opted for is what is known as specification-oriented semantics, which
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is denotational in nature. In such semantics, each construct, in CS−F low, is
described behaviourally in an abstract and formal language (we call this the base
formalism). Normally, specification-oriented semantics has its root in logic as its
"formal” base formalism. However, as long as the base formalism is sufficiently
abstract, it is not necessarily to be a logic-based. The behavioural description
could be done using, for example, traces [62,63],a process algebraic style [31,59,
60, 108, 109, 115] or be indeed a Petri-net style [119].
We have to be cautious here and re-iterate Hoare’s account [63] of the origin
of the terminology. Denotational semantics of a programming/design/specifica-
tion language, makes the distinction clear between the syntax and the semantics.
The later was wholly presented within the mathematical domain of partial func-
tions. These characteristics have been acknowledged and regarded as definitive
of the nature of denotational semantics. What we call "denotational” has been
termed predictive [57, 58], specification-oriented [64], application-oriented, ob-
servational or even relational [16, 92]. The pioneer of the direct style of denota-
tional is Mosses [103] and was justified by its original significance [137, 138]:
• each construct/component of the program has a meaning which is indepen-
dent of its text of the manner of its execution, and
• the meaning of a larger program can be derived as a mathematical function
of the meaning of its syntactic constituent, not of their syntactic form.
Chapter 4. CS−F low: Formalisation 122
Given our desire to animate our CS−F low specifications/designs, expressing the
semantics in an executable base formalism is important.
However, our basic requirements is that the base formalism is sufficiently rich to
be able to express
• context and context-awareness,
• mobility,
• real-time constructs,
• concurrency and
• supports animation and (formal) testing.
In the pi-Calculus [98], [100], [60], [97], [99], and [130] or Duration Calculus [35]
(and their derivatives), expressing context and timing constraints are hard and
sometimes impossible. Bigraphs [25, 78, 83, 96] and the Ambient Calculus [32]
are suitable for context, concurrency and mobility but lack in timing constraints
and executability.
The Calculus for Context-aware Ambient (CCA) [47], which is based on the pi-
Calculus ( [98], [60], [100], [97], [99], [130]) and borrows aspects of Bigraphs
[25, 78, 83, 96], is sufficiently abstract and support all of the above but difficult in
dealing with real-time issues. For these reasons we have chosen CCA.
123 Chapter 4. CS−F low: Formalisation
In addition, in this chapter, we also explore algebraic characterisation of CS−F low.
In doing so, we established a number of algebraic laws which can be used as
• a basis for building equational theory for CS−F low, and
• a tool to manipulate CS−F low models with the aim of adding, e.g., effi-
ciency to a given design.
The Chapter is therefore organised as follows. For the sake of completeness, in
Section 4.2 we briefly introduce CCA. We refer the readers to original article for
more details.
The formal semantics of CS−F low given in CCA is also given in Section(4.3).
Algebraic characterisation of CS−F low is given in Section(4.5) whilst its timing
characterisation and proof rules are given in Section(4.6).
4.2 Calculus of Context-aware Ambient – CCA [47]
We begin by giving a brief introduction to CCA. This presentation is largely based
on the original work in [47].
CCA is a process algebra which is designed for modelling and analysing context-
aware systems. An executable version of the calculus is also available to assess in
models’ animation. There are two main features of the calculus, namely mobility
and context-awareness. The central notion in CCA is that of ambient. An ambient
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represents an abstraction of a place (physical, logical, mobile or immobile– as well
as the environment) which can be mobile and move in and out of another ambients
forming a hierarchical tree structure where an ambient may be contained within
another ambients – forming notions such as parent, children and sibling ambients.
In addition to children ambients, an ambient can also contain a "process” specify-
ing its capabilities (capabilities are used to describe behaviours). Capabilities in
CCA are classified into mobility, context-aware and communication capabilities.
This section presents the syntax and the informal semantics of CCA. Due to the
space limit, only features relevant to our work are presented. We refer interested
readers to [47] for the full details of the calculus.
Table 4.1 depicts the syntax of CCA, based on three syntactic categories: processes
(denoted by P or Q), capabilities (denoted by M) and context-expressions (denoted
by E)1.
Following the tradition of process calculi, e.g. in the pi-calculus ( [97], [100],
[98], [130]), names are assumed to be the simplest entities in the calculus. We
also assume a countably-infinite set of names, e.g., n, x and y. We let y˜ to denote
a list of names and len(y˜) to denote the arity of such a list. y˜ is used sometimes as
a set of names where it is appropriate.
Next, we enlist the informal semantics, [47], of these constructs:
The process 0, does nothing and terminates immediately. The process P | Q
1Context-expressions describe properties of contexts.
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P,Q ::= 0 | P | Q | (ν n) P | !P | n[P] | {P} | E?M.P
| find x˜ : E for P
M ::= in n | out | | α recv(y˜) | α send(y˜) | del n
α ::= ↑ | n ↑ | ↓ | n↓ | :: | n :: | ε
E ::= true | • | n = m | ¬E | E1 | E2 | E1∧E2 |
⊕E | GE
Table 4.1 – Syntax of CCA ( [47])
denotes the process P and the process Q running in parallel. The process (ν n) P
states that the scope of the name n is limited to the process P. The replication !P
denotes a process which can always create a new copy of P ( i.e. !P is equivalent
to P | !P). The process n[P] denotes an ambient named n whose behaviours
are described by the process P. A context expression E?M.P is a process that
waits until the environment satisfies the context expression E, then performs the
capability M and continues like the process P. The dot symbol ‘.’ denotes the
sequential composition of processes. M.P denote the process true?M.P, where
true is a context expression satisfied by all contexts.
The capabilities α send(z˜) and α recv(y˜) are used to send and receive a list of
names from a location α. The location α can be ‘↑ ’ for any parent, ‘n ↑ ’ for a
specific parent n, ‘↓’ for any child, ‘n↓’ for a specific child n, ‘::’ for any sibling,
‘n ::’ for a specific sibling n, or ε (empty string) for the executing ambient itself.
The capability del n deletes an ambient of the form n[0] situated at the same level
as that capability (i.e. the process del n.P | n[0] 2 reduces to P).
2An ambient that is contains the 0 process is denoted by n[0].
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4.3 Process Algebraic-Style Semantics of CS−F low
In this section we give an process algebraic style semantics for CS−F low. The
base formalism is CCA. The semantics is to model each CS−F low activity in CCA.
But we begin by dealing with variables and channels.
4.3.1 Variables
A variable x is a memory cell and is modelled by the following process abstract
where v is the initial value of the variable x:
mem. (x,v). x

〈v〉.0 |
↑().(w).{↑〈w〉.0 | 〈w〉.0} |
↑(u).(y).{↑〈〉.0 | 〈u〉.0}

Read a value of a variable x into the the name n is modelled as the process:
x↓().x↓(n)
Similarly, writing a value t in a variable x can be modelled by the process
x↓〈t〉.x↓〈〉
4.3.2 Channels
A channel c is modelled in CCA as an ambient of name c. Communication over
channels is modelled below.
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4.3.3 Primitive Activities
[[skip]] =̂ 0
[[skip; P]] =̂ [[P]]
[[x := v; P]] =̂ x↓〈v〉.x↓().[[P]]
[[c!v; P]] =̂ c[↑〈v〉.0] . [[P]]
[[c?v; P]] =̂ c↓(v).del c.[[P]]
[[α : {P}]] =̂ α[P]
[[to(α); P]] =̂ (ν m)

m[↑〈〉.0] |
(at(α))?m↓().del m.out.[[P]] |
in α.m↓().del m.[[P]]

[[var x in P]] =̂ (ν x) {[[P]] | mem〈x,0〉}
[[chan c in P]] =̂ (ν c) [[P]]
[[[T1, T2, · · · , Tn] A]] =̂ (tβ − tα) ∈ {T1, T2, · · · , Tn} ∧ [[A]]
Note that tα and tβ are special integer variables denoting the start and end time
of an activity.
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4.3.4 Compound Activities
[[P ‖ Q]] =̂ [[P]] | [[Q]]
[[while G.P]] =̂ (ν x)

x[↑〈〉.0] |
(¬[[G]])?x↓().del x.0 |
! ([[G]])?x↓().del x.[[P]].x[↑〈〉.0]

[[p1 : G1→ P 2 p2 : G2→ Q]] =̂ (ν x)

x[↑〈〉.0] |
(([[G1]]∧¬[[G2]])∨ ([[G1]]∧ [[G2]]∧ p1 ≥ p2))
?x↓().del x.[[P]] |
(([[G2]]∧¬[[G1]])∨ ([[G2]]∧ [[G1]]∧ p2 ≥ p1))
?x↓().del x.[[Q]]

[[delay(t); P]] =̂ (ν clock) (ν m)

clock[〈0〉.0 | ! ↑().(w).{↑〈w〉.0 | 〈w+1〉.0}] |
m[↑〈〉.0] |
! m↓().clock↓().clock↓(x).{(x = t)?del m.[[P]] |
¬(x = t)?del m.m[↑〈〉.0]}

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4.3.5 Semantics of guards
[[true]] =̂ true
[[¬G]] =̂ ¬[[G]]
[[G1∧G2]] =̂ [[G1]]∧ [[G2]]
[[G1∨G2]] =̂ [[G1]]∨ [[G2]]
[[somewhere(α).G]] =̂G α[[[G]]]
4.4 CCA Versus CS−F low
In this section we shall outline the important differences between CCA, and CS−F low
which serves as rational for the reason CCA was our choice.
• variables. CCA has no notion of variables which makes it more abstract but
that makes it rather difficult to model. This is because variables (e.g. chan-
nels have to be modelled as ambients and have a particular structure. On
the other hand, in CS−F low variables and channels can be easily declared
and hence behaviours of activities can be determined.
• Communication. Communication is CS−F low is synchronous. Two com-
municating activities/contexts are linked via a channel (at modelling time,
this is taken to be logical). With this, mobility is much more easier and
where ever an activity moves, it channel(s) move with it. This is not the
case in CCA.
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• Real-time Provision. Unlike CCA, CS−F low have a rich constructs to
model real-time activities. From delays, interrupt to deadlines which help in
schedulability. This is an important characteristic as activities in workflow
can be time dependent.
• Context. In CCA context are hierarchical and identifying neighbors is impor-
tant. For example, we have concepts such as parent, children and siblings.
In workflows this structure are not needed In CS−F low, contexts are flat
and their identities and relationship is not needed, In CS−F low we utilise
the context’s name to manage the complexity of context structure.
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4.5 Algebraic Characterisation of CS−F low
In this section we give a characterisation of CS−F low with some useful algebraic
laws for CS−F low. These laws serve as a useful tool to manipulate a design in
CS−F low and a mechanism to characterise its semantics.
The algebraic laws allow us to give a precise and succinct description of each of
the CS−F low operator. Yet, the laws arise often from our informal understanding
of CS−F low constructs work. As we can see, some of these laws are similar to
their correspondence laws in other process calculi, e.g. CSP and CCS [62], [63],
[98]. An important issue that needs to be mentioned is that these laws are indeed
all congruences in the language’s denotational semantics given in Section(4.3).
We have not considered the construction of normal form for CS−F low. This
was considered outside the scope of the thesis. However, it will be interesting to
develop such a form even if for a small and restricted subset of CS−F low (for
example, "finite” models/designs).
Denotational semantics of [57] map each activity into a domain with a partial
order according to which one activity is greater than another if it is better defined,
or more predictable. Unless indicated explicitly, we make no formal distinction
between the text of a program and its value (semantics). If P and Q are activities,
we will write P v Q when the semantic value of P is less than that of Q.
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Definition 4.5.0.1 An activity P is refined by an activity Q, denoted P v Q, if Q
performs as well as P, or better for any purpose.
This can be expressed as
Pv Q =̂ (G1 → P 2 G2 → Q) = P
The following algebraic laws, using the structural congruence relation ≡, allow
the manipulation of the structure of activities.
4.5.1 Congruence
(S1) P ≡ P
(S2) P ≡ Q ⇒ Q ≡ P
(S3) P≡ Q , Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R
(S4) P ≡ Q ⇒ (P ‖ R) ≡ (Q ‖R)
(S5) P ≡ Q ⇒ α 〈 x˜ 〉 : {P} ≡ α 〈 x˜ 〉 : {Q}
4.5.2 Declaration
Local variables and channel names can be introduced and eliminated.
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(Decl −1) var x˜ in {P} ≡ P (i f x is not in P)
(Decl −2) chan x˜ in {P} ≡ P (i f x is not in P)
(Decl −3) var x˜ in {var y˜ in P} ≡ var y˜ in {var x˜ in P}
≡ var x˜, y˜ in { P}
4.5.3 delay
If t is a period of time, then (delay(t) ; P) is an activity that behaves like P only
after the elapse of t time units. If t = 0, it immediately behaves like P.
(delay −1) delay (t1) ; delay (t2) ≡ delay (t1 + t2)
(delay −2) delay (0) ; P ≡ P
4.5.4 Deadline
For a given activity P and a set of duration S, [S] P is an activity in which P has a
duration/ deadline d ∈ S, within which the activity executes and terminates.
An activity with a zero duration is the skip activity and that durations can be
combined in a sequential composition of activities.
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(Deadline −1) [0] P ≡ skip
(Deadline −2) [tP] P ; [tQ] Q ≡ [tP, tQ] (P ; Q)
The deadline of concurrent activities is at most the maximum of the durations.
(Deadline −3) [tP] P ‖ [tQ] Q v [max (tP, tQ)](P ‖ Q)
(Deadline −4) [t] P v [t ′] P i f t ′ ⊆ t
4.5.5 Sequential
If P and Q are activities with the same alphabet, their composition (P ; Q) repre-
sents a program which runs P first. If P does not terminate, neither does (P; Q).
Q is started if and when P terminates; and then (P ; Q) terminates when Q does.
; is associative with skip is its unity.
(; −1) P ; (Q ; R) ≡ (P ; Q) ; R
(; −2) Q ; skip ≡ Q
≡ skip ; Q
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4.5.6 Alternative
If P and Q are activities, with the same alphabet, guarded by G1 and G2 respec-
tively, the notation G1 → P 2 G2 → Q describes a program that may behaves
as P or as Q, but does not determine which it shall be if both guards are evaluated
to true, i.e. passable.
When two alternatives are the same activity, the choice becomes vacuous.
(Alt −1) (G → P 2 G → P) ≡ G → P
(Alt −2) (G → P 2 not G → P) ≡ P
(Alt −3) (G → P 2 not G → Q) ≡ not G → Q 2 G → P
(Alt −4) (c → (b → P 2 not b → Q) 2 not c → R) ≡
(b and c) → P 2 not (b and c) → (c → Q 2 not c → R)
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(Alt −5) b → P 2 not b → (c → P 2 not c → Q) ≡
b or c → P 2 not (b or c) → Q
Proof:
L.H.S = (Alt−3)
not b → (not c → Q 2 c → P) 2 b → P
= (Alt−2 and Alt−4)
(not c and b→ Q) 2 (c or b → P)
= R.H.S. (Alt−3) 
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(Alt −6) b → P 2 not b → (b → Q 2 not b → R) ≡
b → P 2 not b → R
Proof:
L.H.S = (Alt−3)
b → (not b → R 2 b → Q) 2 not b → P
= (Alt−4)
false → Q 2 not false → (not b → R 2 not not(b) → P)
=
false → Q 2 true → (not b → R 2 b → P)
=
(not b → R 2 b → P)
=
(b → P 2 not b → R)
= R.H.S.

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The order in which a nondeterministic choice is made is immaterial.
(Alt −7) G1 → P 2 G2 → Q ≡ G2 → Q 2 G1 → P
Choice can be distributed with the ;
(Alt −8) (G1→ R 2 G2→ S) ; P ≡ G1→ (R ; P) 2 G2→ (S ; P)
We only choose the true guarded activity.
(Alt −9) true→ P 2 false→ Q ≡ P
(Alt −10) false→ P 2 true→ Q ≡ Q
(Alt −11) (G1 → P1 2 G2 → P2) v P2 (i f G2 ≡ true)
This can be strengthened to: (G1 →P12G2→ P2) is refined by Q i f G1 =⇒
G2
The nondeterministic choice is disjunctive and associative.
(Alt −12) G1→ R 2 G2→ S ≡ (G1 and R)or(G2and S)
(Alt −13) (G1 → R 2 G2 → S) 2 G3 → P ≡ (G1 → R) 2 (G2 → S 2 G3 → P)
(Alt −14) (G and (G1 → P 2 G2 → Q) ≡ G and G1 → P 2 G and G2 → Q)
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(Alt −15) a → P 2 (b → Q 2 c → R) ≡ (a → P 2 b → Q) 2 (a → P 2 c → R)
Proof:
R.H.S = (Alt−2 and Alt−3)
(a → P 2 a → P) 2 (b → Q 2 c → R)
= L.H.S. (Alt−13)

4.5.7 Interrupt
The activity P .Gt Q behaves like the activity P for a duration of t time and while
G is false. If G remains false for this duration, Q never executes. However, during
this duration, if G becomes passable, then it stops behaving like P and instead,
it behaves like Q (note that the initial state is restored; i.e. Q will start from the
initial state of the original activity, P .Gt Q . In such a case the duration t is
immaterial. Two observations are in order: (a) the computation performed by P
before the interrupt are lost and the Q can resume (e.g. to repair the damage done
by P), and (b)
This activity distribute through ‖
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(Interrupt −1) (P .Gt Q) ‖ (S .Gt T ) ≡ (P ‖ S) .Gt (Q ‖ T )
(Interrupt −2) P .Gt+1 Q ≡ (P .Gt Q) .G1 Q
(Interrupt −3) P .Gt (Q .G0 R) ≡ P .Gt Q (i f G has become f alse during t)
(Interrupt −4) (P .truet Q) ; R ≡ Q ; R
4.5.8 Parallel
P ‖Q is an activity whose components P and Q are activities running concurrently,
with the possibility of communication between them. The activity terminates only
when its components terminates.
(‖ −1) P ‖ Q ≡ Q ‖ P
(‖ −2) P ‖ (Q ‖ R) ≡ (P ‖ Q) ‖ R
(‖ −3) P ‖ skip ≡ P
≡ skip ‖ P
An empty ‖ terminates immediately.
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(‖ −4) 〈 〉 ‖ 〈 〉 ≡ skip
(‖ −5) (Chan!v) ; P ‖ (Chan?x) ; Q ≡ P ‖x := v ; Q
(‖ −6) P ‖ (G1→ R 2 G2→ S) ≡ G1→ (R ‖ P) 2 G2→ (S ‖ P)
4.5.9 Assignment
v˜ := e˜ is an activity that assigns the value of an expression list e˜ to the variable
list v˜ and then terminate successfully.
The empty multiple assignment terminates with all variables unchanged. (we use
〈〉 to denote empty list): (asgn−1) 〈〉 := 〈〉 ≡ skip
The assignment of a variable’s own value to itself has no effect. (We use the
normal multiple assignments notation, i.e. (x,y := 1,2) means that x and y are
assigned to the values 1 and 2 respectively). If x˜ and y˜ are disjoint, then
(asgn−2) (x˜, y˜ := e˜, y˜) ≡ (x˜ := e˜).
List permutation of variables and expressions are allowed and has no effect the
meaning of assignment:
(asgn−3) (x, y, z := a, b, c) ≡ (y, x, z := b, a, c).
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4.5.10 Somewhere
somewhere(α) · G {P} is an activity which behaves like P only when, somewhere
within the context α, the guard G evaluate to true.
(somewhere −1) somewhere(α) · G {P} ‖ somewhere(α) · G {Q}
≡
somewhere(α) · G {P ‖ Q}
(somewhere −2) somewhere(α) · G1 {P} ‖ somewhere(α) · G2 {P}
≡
somewhere(α) · (G1 and G2) {P}
(Note that we assume that both G1 and G2 are true in the same context. How-
ever, if both are true but in different places then we have to assert that there will
be no place where G1 and G2 is true.)
(somewhere −3) somewhere(α) · true {skip} ≡ skip
(somewhere −4) somewhere(α) · true {abort} ≡ abort
(Note that (Somewhere3&−4) can be generalised to:
somewhere(α) · true {P} ≡ P)
143 Chapter 4. CS−F low: Formalisation
4.5.11 abort
abort is what we might call a broken activity. It will never interact with the
outside world and, worst still, the outside world can never detect this fact. Whilst
it may be performing some internal actions, the observer cannot disregard that it
might still do something!
abort is an activity whose behaviour is completely undefined. No other activity
share the same characteristics, as it performs internal actions forever attempting
to decide what its behaviour will be, but never makes any progress. Worst still, an
observer can not see that!
(abort −1) abort ≡ while true do skip od
(abort −2) abort ; P ≡ abort
(abort −3) abort ‖ P ≡ abort
4.5.12 Loop
(Loop −1) P ≡ Q ⇒ while G {P} ≡ while G {Q}
(Loop −2) while G {P} ≡ G → P ; while G {P}
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4.5.13 Mobility
Uncovering algebraic algebraic characterisation for mobility, expressed by the op-
erator "to α” (where α is a context), is interesting. For example, we may expect
that
β 〈〉 : {to (α) ; skip} ≡ skip which is clearly incorrect.
The algebraic characterisation of mobility has to be operational in nature and will
be well understood in a reduction-style semantics. In such a semantics, we can
formulate a statement such as " when the above activity is released, then perform-
ing the step: to (α), will lead to it moving to the (new) context, α, where it may
be ready to take another step in which it will execute the sub activity skip”.
However the following is true:
β 〈〉 : {to (α) ; skip} ‖ α 〈〉 : { } → β 〈〉 : { } ‖ α 〈〉 : {skip}
Similarly, we have
β 〈〉 : {to (α) ; abort ‖ α 〈〉 : { } → β 〈〉 : { } ‖ α 〈〉 : {abort}
We note the use of → which carries the informal meaning: "reduces to”. Sim-
ilar rules can be constructed as we shall see in Chapter(6) (page 193). How-
ever, we can formulate the following rules: "eliminating brackets” and "stuttering:
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(Mobility −1) β 〈〉 : {to (α) (P ; Q)} ≡ β 〈〉 : {to (α) P ; Q}
(Mobility −2) β 〈〉 : {to (α) (P ‖ Q)} ≡ β 〈〉 : {to (α) P ‖ to (α) Q}
(Mobility −3) β 〈〉 : {to β P} ≡ β 〈〉 : {P }
Another interesting phenomenon with the mobility operator is its "hopping” and
"discrete” behaviours: For example
(to (β) (to (α) P)) → to (α) P
Here, the activity moves to β, then to α and then returns back to α. This raises
the question of discreetness: If an activity moves from its current context (say
α) to another context, β, does it mean, there must have been a number of other
(hidden/implicit) contexts where the activity has gone through before reaching its
final context? In our model, this is not necessarily true as contexts are uniquely
“named" and hence have no “structure" at all. However, hopping may be used to
model proximity of contexts and neighborhoods.
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4.5.14 Algebraic Structures
The algebraic rules given above provide a useful tool to manipulate "structures”
of CS−F low models. These laws however induce complete algebraic "charac-
terisation” for CS−F low. These characterisations comes in the form of known
structures.
Let A be the set of activities, then (given zero =̂ not (skip ; delay(0))):
1. (A , ‖, ; , 2, zero, delay(0), abort) is an idempotent left semiring :
• (A ,‖,delay(0)) is a commutative monoid (‖ −1 , ‖ −2, and ‖ −3),
• (A , ; ,zero) is a monoid (; −1 and ; −2);
• (A ,2,abort) is a commutative monoid.
2. (A ,not) is a Boolean idempotent left semiring because of
• (1) above and
• b1 = not ((not(b1)) or (not b2)) or not((not(b1)) or b2)
• (a and b) = not ((not a) or (not b))
• true = a or (not a)
• false = a and (not a)
3. We also have the usual properties relating to Boolean Kleene algebra.
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4.5.15 example
The above algebraic laws can be used to structurally transform a given mod-
el/specification to an equivalent one whose properties are known. As a simple,
but illustrative example, the model
(4.1) var x in { x := v }
is deadlock-free. We can utilise the above laws to infer that the following model
(Eq(4.2) is also deadlock-free:
(4.2) chan c in { c ! v ‖ (var x in{c ? x }) }
The transformation proceeds as follows
Eq(4.2) ≡ (decl−3)
chan c var x in { c ! v ‖ c ? x }
≡ (‖−5)
chan c var x in {skip ‖ x := v }
≡ (‖−3)
chan c var x in { x := v}
≡ (decl−1)
var x in { x := v }
≡ Eq(4.1)

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4.6 Timing Behaviours
4.6.1 introduction
As we mentioned earlier, activities in workflows can be time-dependent and it was
important in the design of CS−F low to make appropriate provisions by providing
constructs such as delay and [S] P. In this section we give some of the important
and useful timing characterisation of activities. Once again, let us recall that we
let t represents time, such that t ∈ N 3 and that tα and tβ denotes the start and
termination time of an activity, such that
tα ≤ tβ.
(i.e. We also assume that the termination time of an activity will be at, or after its
release time.). Let us also use at to be a function that returns a value of a state
variable at a particular "point” in time: The at mapping is defined as
at : Var × N :→ N
For example for the activity z := x + y,
z at (tβ) = x at (tα) + y at (tα)
3The time domain is modelled by (N ,≤), where ≤ is a total order
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We can describe the "stability” of a variable X using a time predicate P (t) which
has a single free time variable:
P (t) =̂ X at (t) = X at (t−1)
Various important timing properties can be defined. Here we consider duration
(D), within (W ), after ( A ), between ( B ) and every ( E ).
Definition 4.6.1.1
(4.3) D  n
This is defined for any binary relation, , on positive integers and asserts
various constraints over the execution interval.
(4.4) W (n, tα, tβ,P (t)) =̂
∨
i ∈[tα,min(tα + n, tβ)]
P [i/t]
W asserts that P (t) is valid at a point in time within the first n time unites
after the activity was released.
(4.5) A (n, tα, tβ,P (t)) =̂
∨
i ∈[tα + n, tβ]
P [i/t]
A asserts that P (t) holds true at a point in time after the first n time unites
from the activity’s release.
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(4.6) B (P (t), tα, tβ,n,Q (t)) =̂
∧
i ∈[tα, tβ− n]
P [i/t] ⇒
∨
j ∈[i min(i + n, tβ)]
Q [ j/t]
This asserts that for every time for which P (t) is true there must be a time, not
more than n time unites away, at which Q (t) is true.
(4.7) E (n, tα, tβ, P (t)) =̂
∧
i ∈Pr(tα,tβ,n)
W (n,P (t))[i/tα, i+n/tβ]
where
Pr(a,b,n) =̂ {i : i ∈ [a,b] ∧ ∃ l ((n.l) + a = i) ∧ n+ i ≤ b}
This asserts that for at least one instant of time within each consecutive time
interval of length n, P (t) must be true (except for the remainder of the interval if
it is less than n time unites). 
4.6.2 Properties
We can derive a number of proof rules that governs these timing predicates. Our
rational for this is to be able to formally prove some interesting timing properties
for activities.
We adopt the general form of a rule:
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(Name)
C1,
C2,
· · ·
Cn
Design/model |= prop
where Ci is a constraints. The rule states that given the constraints, then the
Design/model satisfies the prop.
4.6.3 duration – D
Let primitive ∈ {!,?,x := v, }. We have
(Dur−0) primitive |= D ≥ 1
Any primitive construct should take one or more 1 time unite.
(Dur−1)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m
P ; Q |= D ≥ (n+m)
The sequential composition of two activities takes at least the sum of the durations
of both.
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(Dur−2)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m
P ‖ Q |= D ≥ max(n,m)
The parallel composition of two activities takes at least the largest duration of
both.
(Dur−3)
P |= D ≥ n
[S] P |= D ≥ n
The duration of an activity (if known) is at least one of its allocated (at design
phase) deadlines.
(Dur−3a)
P |= Φ
[S] P |= Φ
(Dur−4) (Dur−4) [S] P |= D ∈ S
However, if its duration is not known, then it must be one of those that was allo-
cated at design time (i.e. one in S).
(Dur−5)
P |= D ≥ n,
G
(while G do P od) |= D ≥ n
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For as long as we know the duration of an activity, we can infer the duration of its
repetitive behaviour.
(Dur−6)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m,
G1 at tα ∨ G2 at tα
(G1 → P2 G2 → Q) |= D ≥ min(n,m)
The duration of the conditionals is at least the duration of its minimum; and it is
obviously true that
(Dur−7)
Q |= D ≥ n
(P .falset Q) |= D ≥ (n+ t)
(Dur−8) delay(n) |= D ≥ n
4.6.4 within – W
(within−1) P |= W (n,P (t))
P ; Q |= W (n,P (t))
(within−2)
P |= W (n,P (t))
[S]P |= W (n,P (t))
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(within−3)
P |= W (n,P (t)),
P |= D = (n+m)
P |= W (n+m, P (t))
(within−3a)
P |= ∨t ∈ [tα,tβ] P (t)
P |= D ≤ n
P |= W (n,P (t))
(within−4)
P |= D ≤ n,
P |= ∨σ ∈ [tα,tβ] P (t)
P |= W (n,P (t))
(within−5) P |= D ≤ n
P ‖Q |= W (n,P (t))
4.6.5 after – A
(a f ter−1)
P |= A (n,P (t))
P ; Q |= A (n,P (t))
(a f ter−2)
P |= A (n,P (t))
P ‖Q |= A (n,P (t))
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(a f ter−3)
Q |= A (n,P (t)),
P |= D ≥ m
P ; Q |= A (n+m,P (t))
4.6.6 between – B
(between−1)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
A ‖ B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
(between−2)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
A ; B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
(between−3)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t)),
B |= B (P(t),m,Q(t))
m ≤ n
A ; B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
(between−4)
A |= B (P(t), l,Q(t)),
B |= B (P(t), l,Q(t)),
A |= D = n,
B |= D = n
A ‖ B |= B (P(t), l,Q(t))
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4.6.7 every – E
(every−1)
m ≥ n,
P |= A (n, P (t)),
P |= D = m
(while G do P od) |= E (m, A (n, P (t)))
(every−2)
P |= E (n, P (t)),
Q |= E (m, Q (t))
(P ‖ Q) |= E (n, P (t)) ∧ E (m, Q (t))
(every−3)
P |= D = l,
∃ m • (m.n = l),
P |= E (n, P (t)),
Q |= E (n, P (t))
(P ; Q) |= E (n, P (t))
(every−4)
P |= W (l,P (t)),
P |= D = m
([m.n] while G = n do P od) |= E (m, W (l,P (t)))
4.6.8 General Rules
In addition to the above, there are some (traditional) general rules which are use-
ful.
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(Weaken)
P |= Φ
Φ ⇒ Ψ
Ψ |= P
(and)
P |= Φ
P |= Ψ
P |= Φ ∧ Ψ
4.7 Summary
In the previous chapter we have motivated the need for a novel design notation
for workflow systems. Our arguments stem from the realisations that current
workflow systems are highly distributed, cross boundaries of variety of organi-
sation/enterprises and above all have timing characteristics.
Therefore any new notation/language has to enjoy the following features:
• support concurrency;
• context and context awareness are first-class citizen;
• supports mobility as activities can move from one context to another;
• has the ability to express timing constrains: delay, deadlines, priority and
schedulability;
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• allows the expressibility of (access control) security policies without the
need for an extra linguistic complexities;
• enjoy sound formal semantics that allows us to animate design and compare
various designs.
In this chapter we have given, a formal semantics to CS−F low, which satis-
fies all of the above. We also gave an algebraic characterisation to the language
which will give us the mechanism for analyses and proofs.
Chapter 5
CS−F low
CLOSED LAYERS: Design
Principle
Objectives
• Discuss the rational for the design principle of closed layers and give a procedure
for constructing them.
• Provide a development life cycle for layer design.
• Explore the design of fault-tolerant workflows using Closed layers.
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5.1 Introduction
Designing and analysing software system is intrinsically hard. In fact the quest for
an engineering process has been of concern to theoreticians and practitioners alike
for many decades. And still is an active area of research and development. From,
what has been termed "traditional” development process, the so called waterfall,
to agile development process, through, rapid prototyping and extreme program-
ming and development.
The reason for this is that a development process should deal with not only
the mere construction of the artifacts but also our ability to analysis their current
behaviours and predicting their future ones.
Currently, practitioners within software houses and industries, in general (and un-
like those in more traditional engineering disciplines), adopt what they see fit in
the development given various constraints such as time, budget, available exper-
tise, etc. Even the sharing of best practices amongst them is hardly practiced.
This is certainly true for transformational (closed) systems in which their be-
haviours can be fully determined by the relationship between their input and out-
put – for example, compilers, payroll systems, etc. The situation becomes much
harder when developing concurrent/distributed systems, and even more so when
considering those of reactive characteristics such as what is now commonly known
as ubiquoutus systems – systems which are context-aware.
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As we have already established, workflow systems are typical example of this
type and they are even harder as the majority of them have timing characteristics
as well as being highly distributed. For example, some workflows within a typical
hospital ward may have to satisfy some hard real-time constraints, such as insulin
must be injected at some regular intervals.
In addition, being a transactional systems, some workflow systems can be of long-
running transaction in which dependability requirements are crucial. These re-
quirements vary from being highly reliable and available, to being safe and secure.
For example, a context-aware system for an operating room in a hospital, must
have a general awareness of the working context, such as staff, patient, equip-
ment, and medical material. From such context information, the system should be
able to provide the surgical team with important clinical data correctly and at the
appropriate moment (such as medical images and medical records), as well as to
detect potential safety critical situations, such as the wrong patient is detected or
if the surgery is started before the team is ready.
Given the complex nature of current workflows, being highly distributed, secure-
critical and being context-aware, the quest for a design technique that help to
increase its reliability becomes crucial. This chapter describes a design technique
that will allow the design of a reliable, context and secure workflow. The ap-
proach is based on the notion of communication-closed layers. The work on
communication-closed layer was first presented by Elrad and Francez [45] as a
Chapter 5. CS−F low: Closed Layers 162
notion for analysing distributed systems with message passing as its communica-
tion mechanism. Later, it was adapted for scheduling real-time tasks in a tightly-
bound environment [44]. Various authors, [46, 77, 107, 150, 151], have studied
the notion from a theoretical view point. In this chapter, we review the notion of
closed layer in general and present it as
• a general design principle of CS−F low workflow applications;
• a base for a high-level programming construct which can offer a linguistic
support for the design of reliable (fault-tolerant) workflow systems; and
• an efficient approach for the analyses of workflows.
We begin in Section(5.2) with an explanation what a layer is and how it can be
systematically constructed. We distinguished between communicating and non-
communicating layers and that under a certain condition, a communicating layer
can be communication-closed. Then we give a constructive technique by which
a semantically-equivalent communication-closed layer system (that is quasi- se-
quential) to the original system. We have also elaborated on the fact that in the
presence of timing constrains, time-closeness is also required and give a process to
construct time-closed layers. We end the chapter with a disscusion, Section(5.5)
on how layers can be be utilised efficiently to design a reliable (fault-tolerant)
CS−F low workflow systems.
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5.2 Layer Construction
Let us consider the following general workflow in CS−F low, Table (5.1), which
has two concurrent activities P and Q :
C1 〈a˜〉 : { P } ‖C2 〈b˜〉 : { Q }
such that
• C1 and C2 are context identifications and that a˜ and b˜ are their sets of at-
tributes.
• P and Q are activities.
Specifically, we have1
1We opted for a vertical representation of workflow only for clarity. Horizontal-type of repre-
sentation may be economical but might not be as clear.
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Table 5.1 – General Structure in CS−F low
C1 〈a˜〉 : C2 〈b˜〉 :
{ {
var x˜, y˜ in var x˜1, y˜1 in
{ {
P1; Q1;
P2; Q2;
P3; ‖ Q3;
P4;
P5;
} }
} }
Assumptions. In order to simplify the presentation, and without lose of gener-
ality, we assume that
• There is only one parallel operator, ‖, in our system. Nesting concurrency
can be dealt with by applying the transformation to the most inner ‖ and
continue to move to the outer constructs. For example, if Q3 =̂ Q31 ‖ Q32,
then we apply our layering technique to Q3 and then move upwards.
• The length of all activities in the system are the same. I.e. each of the
activities under consideration has the same number of sub activities. This
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can be easily achieved using the semantics of skip. I.e.
skip ; S ≡ S ; skip ≡ S
The system above is equivalent to the one in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 – General Structure in CS−F low
C1 〈a˜〉 : C2 〈b˜〉 :
{ {
var x˜, y˜ in var x˜1, y˜1 in
{ {
P1; skip;
P2; Q1;
P3; ‖ skip;
P4; Q2;
P5; Q3;
} }
} }
In another words, we can pad the shorter with as many skip. We present a trans-
formation process that transform a given concurrent system into what we call
quasi-parallel system. This provides a super-structure over the usual process-
based structure. Such a super-structure will both facilitated the design and the
analysis of workflow systems and also provides a natural way of achieving fault-
tolerance.
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As a simple but illustrative running example, let us consider the following running
CS−F low workflow which has two concurrent activities P and Q :
R =̂ C1 〈a˜〉 : { P } ‖C1 〈b˜〉 : { Q }
P and Q are given in Table(5.3)
Table 5.3 – The P and Q in R
C1 〈a˜〉 : C2 〈b˜〉 :
{ {
var x, y, z, chan1 in var x1, chan1 in
{ {
y := y + x; chan1 ? x1;
z := y × z; ‖ x1 := x1 × x1;
chan1 ! z;
} }
} }
To begin with, let us define few important terms:
Definition 5.2.0.1 A layer, L of a workflow, S , is a logical horizontal partition
that cut across all concurrent threads of S 
.
Definition 5.2.0.2 A super-structure over a workflow, S , is a quasi-sequential
composition of layers from S 
.
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The super-structures are in fact "safe” decomposition of our original workflow.
Let us now design a number of super-structures over our workflow R . We should
note that the "design” is by construction. Our construction starts with extracting a
number of layers from which we build the super-structure(s). (Note that we have
deliberately removed all declarations to simplify the presentation.)
Let us consider the following layers:
Table 5.4 – Some Layers
L1 =̂ y := y + x ‖ chan1 ? x1
L2 =̂ z := y × z ‖ x1 := x1 × x1
L3 =̂ chan1 ! z ‖ skip
L4 =̂ y := y + x; skip;‖
z := y × z skip
L5 =̂
z := y × z ; skip ;
chan1 ! z ; ‖ chan1 ? x1 ;
skip x1 := x1 × x1
Nesting layer can be also constructed as long the closeness property is preserved
(to ensure safety de-composition). Let us consider our L5 in the above workflow,
R . We can clearly construct (decompose) another layer:
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Table 5.5 – L6: Communicating Layer
chan1 ! z; chan1 ? x1;
and L5 can now be written as:
Table 5.6 – L5: Layer Nesting
z := y × z; skip;
L6.1; ‖ L6.2;
skip; x1 := x1 × x1
The following are some super-structures:
1. SR1 =̂ R
2. SR2 =̂ L1 ; L2 ; L3
3. SR3 =̂ L4 ; L5
It is obviously clear that, for an CS−F low workflow S , there are n! of super-
structures, where n is the sum of the lengths of all its concurrent threads. An
important question will therefore be:
Under what condition(s) will a super-structure workflow be equivalent to the
original one?.
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In our running example, which super-structure, SR2 or SR3 , is equivalent to R ?
For this we need the following preliminaries.
Definition 5.2.0.3 A Layer L is called communicating layer if it contains at least
one communication primitive. It is called communication-closed if a communica-
tion starts and terminates in the same layer.
A non-communicating layer is that which contains no communication primitives.
The various layer structures are depicted in Figure(5.1).
Figure 5.1 – Layers
It is clear that, in the example above, L2 and L4 are non-communicating layers
while L1,L3 and L5 are communication-closed. SR3 and SR1 are a quasi-sequential
workflow whilst SR2 is not.
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5.3 Dealing with Choices and Iterations
The decomposition of a given CS−F low system, requires a process to deal with
structures such as choices and iterations. In this section we study the decomposi-
tion of these structures.
5.3.1 Process for Choices
Let us consider the general form of a choice. Here, we consider the non-deterministic
case as proioritised choices are straightforward. We also omit any declaration to
simplify the presentation. We begin by a procedure that unravels choices. We
should recall that that guards are purely Boolean variables and are not commu-
nicating guards (unlike languages such as OCCAM/CSP [62]). Let us consider
the following guarded-choice workflow S in which one or all of its sub activities
contain communication activities with other workflow of the same (or different
structure) 2. Let us consider the following workflow, (S),
Table 5.7 – Choices: S
G1→ P
2
G2→ Q
2The most interesting case is that where we have the same structures
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The question here is: can we transform S to a semantically equivalent workflow,
i.e. which is composed of a communication-closed layer structure?3. The follow-
ing gives a procedure that enables us to do so.
The following workflow, S ′, is a such safe decomposition:
S ′ =̂


G1 → P ; GFlag := false
2
G2 → GFlag := true
 ; (S11)
 GFlag → Q2
not GFlag → skip
 (S12)

We can see that S ≡ S ′ for the following reason. There are four cases:
• G1 and G2 are both false: then the first branch (S11) in the sequence will
abort as required by the semantics,
• G1 is true and G2 is false, then P is executed and GFlag is set to false,
and the second branch (S12) executes to skip,
• G1 evaluates to false and G2 to true, then P will not be executed, GFlag
3This is known as safe decomposition, [45]
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will be then set to true, and the second branch executes Q as required,
• G1 is evaluated to true and that G2 is evaluated to true then first branch
chooses whether to execute P and the set GFlag to false, or set GFlag to
true. The second branch only executes Q if GFlag is true (i.e. only if the
first branch choses not to execute P).
Now, if we have another workflow D of the same structure as S then
S ‖ D
can be "safely” decomposed into the structure:
((S11 ‖ D11 ) ; (S12 ‖ D12 )) 2 ((S21 ‖ D21 ) ; (S22 ‖ D22)) (1)
where each Si j, for all i, j = 1,2, is either a non-communicating layer or a
communication-closed layer.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
((S11 ‖ D11)2(S21 ‖ D21));
((S11 ‖ D11)2(S22 ‖ D22));
((S12 ‖ D12)2(S21 ‖ D21));
((S12 ‖ D12)2(S22 ‖ D22)) (2)
The structures (1) and (2) demonstrate that layers can be composed, respectively,
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as a series of alternative or sequentially. In fact, structures such as iteration, con-
ditional, interrupt, etc. can also be used.
5.3.2 Process for Iterations
We assume that
1. Loops are finite
2. Communication symmetry is assured (i.e., communication-deadlock free)
It should be noted that due to (1) above, a finite loop can be replaced as a set
of sequentially composed statements and because of (2), we can always ensure
(using skip) that each layer is communication-closed layer. Therefore, using
while G do{P} ≡ G → P ; (while G do{P})
then, if we have
while G do{P}‖Q
Then we can transform this to the semantically equivalent CS−F low system
((G → P) ‖ Q) ; (while G do{P})
Then, we layer ((G → P) ‖ Q) into communication-closed layers (depending on
the structure of P and Q, and repeat the process on the while G do{P}, and so on.
Theorem 5.3.1 For any CS−F low workflow system S there exist a semantically
equivalent quasi-sequential system, SL .
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Proof: The proof is by construction. Let S =̂ S1 ‖S2‖ · · · ‖ Sn. The construction
follows three basic steps:
• Padding. Ensure that all Si are of the same length 4, using skip, applying
rule (; -2) and (‖ -3)
• Locate correspondence communication activities and form a communica-
tion layer. Others can form non-communicating layers. If communica-
tions appear in non-deterministic activity, apply the transformation given
in Section(5.3).
• Resolve communication using rule (‖ -5). 
Notes
• As most, if not all, workflow systems have timing constraints, the communication-
closed layer notion needs to be modified and introduce what might be called
time-closed layer:
[t] S
is transformed to
[t1] L1 ; [t2] L2 ; · · · [tn] Ln
such that t ≥ ∑ ti; this needs further development.
4I.e. each Si has the same number of sub activities
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• Existing proof systems can be utilised on the resulting quasi-sequential sys-
tem. For example, Haore’s triple formalism can be readily applied:
if {p1} L1 {q1} and {q1} L2 {q2} then {p1} (L1 ; L2) {q2}
The development of such proof system as well as high-level linguistic sup-
port for layer constructs are some of issues for future work (Chapter(8),
page 247).
5.4 Layer Design Methodology
To utilize the concept of closed-layers, we need a layer-design methodology.
This section outlines our methodology and gives a simple but illustrative example
to demonstrate its use. However, the example is a generic and can be utilise in the
design of larger CS−F low systems.
To begin with, we have to distinguish between two distinct directions where Lay-
ers can be used:
• Analysis. In this direction, we assume the existence of an CS−F low sys-
tem which is to be analyse. Analysis here involves the whole spectrum of
validation and verification: from animation/simulation and run-time valida-
tion to formal proofs and/or model checking of some known properties (e.g.
safety and/or liveness properties [121, 123, 131, 133]; as a simple example
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is to demonstrate its absence of deadlocks.
The idea here is to transform the existing CS−F low design into a seman-
tically equivalent communication-closed layer design in which the analyses
are easier than the original one. The rational is that the resulting layer-
design is quasi-sequential and hence all existing formalisms for sequential
systems can be deployed. (for example, Hoare’s logic, Dijkstra’s pre/post
condition formalisms, etc.)
• Design. Here we assume a general statement of system’s requirements,
which we can be decomposed into a set of layer requirements and proceed
in a traditional fashion. In this case, we apply the following phases:
1. Requirements Decomposition. In this phase, we decompose the given
workflow requirements into a number of sub-requirements. These sub-
requirements can be as fine or coarse grain as we wish. This is the
most difficult phase in the development. This is because, for an effi-
cient decomposition of the requirements, we rely on experience and
understanding the none-functional requirements of the system, etc. It
is therefore important that such a phase has to be iterative in nature.
Experience has shown that, identifying, what we call Actors helps in
specifying layer interfaces.
In addition, this phase also involve the identification of all channels
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that may be needed for communications, and also all of the state vari-
ables of interest (for these are fundamental to study behaviours).
2. Layer Design. In this phase, we design layers which conform/satisfy
its requirement. The layers however have to be communication-closed
layers. For conformity and/or satisfaction, we deploy classical/well
established techniques.
3. Integration. In this phase we compose/integrate all layers into a com-
plete CS−F low workflow.
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the layering development on one of
our previous example given in Section(3.5).
5.4.1 Example
Here we consider the one-place buffer.
1. Requirements Decomposition. In this example, we can easily identify two
major layers:
1. Initialisation. Involves the Buffer and the Authorised_User, and using chan-
nel push.
2. Operations. This involves the Buffer and any other user.
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Init =̂
push ! v ‖ (push ? x ; empty := false) ‖ skip
2. Layer Design.
(5.1)
Operation =̂

skip ‖

while true do
{
empty → push ? x
2
not empty → pull ! v
}
od

‖
 pull ? x ;
push ! v


It is clear that each of the above layers are communication-closed and the resulting
quasi-sequential system is
SysL =̂ Init ; Operation · · · · · · · · · (a)
3. Integration. In this phase, the layers are integrated to obtain the final system:
Sys =̂ Authorised_User ‖ Buffer ‖ User · · · · · · · · · (b)
where
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(5.2) Buffer =̂

push ? x ;
empty := false ;
while true
do
{
empty → push ? x
2
not empty → pull ! v ;
empty := true
}
od

and the users are modelled as
(5.3) Users ::
 Authorised_User =̂ push ! v
User =̂ pull ? x ; push ! v

We note that, as the layers were designed communication-closed, then Sys_L ≡
Sys.
Further Layering and Analysis. The above Operation layer can be further de-
composed by unravellings both the loop and non-deterministic choice sub-structures.
Let
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(5.4) Buf =̂

while true
do
{
empty → push ? x
2
not empty → pull ! v ;
empty := true
}
od

And let us first consider the loop’s body
(5.5) Bufbody =̂
 empty → push ? x2
not empty → pull ! v ;
empty := true

Using the process in Section(5.3) (page 170), Bu fbody is semantically equivalent
to
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true →


empty → (push ? x)
2
not empty → skip
 ;

not empty → ((pull ! v) ; empty := true)
2
not empty and empty → abort
2
empty → skip


2
true →


not empty → (pull ! v) ; empty := true
2
empty → skip
 ;

empty → (push ? x)
2
empty and not empty → abort
2
not empty → skip


Using the Alt algebraic laws (Alt−1−Alt−4), Bufbody can be reduced to
true →


empty → (push ? x)
2
not empty → skip
 ;

not empty → ((pull ! v) ; empty := true)
2
empty → skip


2
Chapter 5. CS−F low: Closed Layers 182
true →


not empty → (pull ! v) ; empty := true
2
empty → skip
 ;

empty → (push ? x)
2
not empty → skip


And further, Bufbody is transformed to
Bufbody =̂
((
not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true ) 2 ( empty → push ? x )) ;
empty → push ? x
2
not empty → skip
 ;

not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true
2
empty → skip
 ;
((
not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true ) 2 ( empty → push ? x ))
We note that
Buf =̂ Bufbody ; Buf
Now are ready to construct some further layers. For example, we can readily have
two layers, PULL, SKIP and PUSH:
(5.6) PULL =̂

not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true
2
empty → push ? x
‖
pull ? x

and
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(5.7) PUSH =̂

empty → push ? x
2
not empty → skip
‖
push ! v

and
SKIP =̂ skip ‖


not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true
2
empty → skip
 ;
 not empty → pull ! v ; empty := true2
empty → push ? x


The Operation layer in equation (a) (page 178) can now be unraveled to become:
(PULL ; PUSH ; SKIP ) ; Buff
We should note that the above example has only one user, the generalisation to
more than one user is straightforward.
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5.5 Fault-Tolerance Provisions
"Atomicity” and "atomic actions” [18, 66, 72, 87, 88] have been recognised as im-
portant concept, both at specification, design and implementation of computing
systems. They were first introduced as a means to characterise programs by their
input and output relations (i.e. transformation systems) and many error recovery
techniques have been introduced [18, 66, 72].
The interest in devising error recovery techniques has increased due to the fact that
it may be generalised to similar concepts to recovery when dealing with parallel
systems. As it turned out, error recovery in parallel systems were much harder.
As for workflow systems, which are
• inherently distributed;
• may contain, what is know to be, long-running activities; and are also
• security-critical,
this conventional failure model must be re-considered as designers need to deal
with partial computations. These partial computations, may have accessed and/or
altered sensitive information.
Atomic activity, or atomicity in general, is a portion of the program that enjoys
primitive status with regards to its environment, though it may have a rather com-
plicated internal structure and processing. For example, in database setting, this
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has been widely used and acknowledged extensively and are known a transac-
tions.
The characterisation of atomicity is sometimes known as serialisability property:
an activity is known to be atomic if it can be considered, as far as its environment
is concerned, to be indivisible and instantaneous, [43]. Once this is understood,
atomic activities allow recoverability in a simple manner. In what follows, we
show how layers are in fact atomic actions which facilitate the design of fault-
tolerant workflows.
5.6 Layers and Atomicity
The layer structure presented here, offer a general framework for structuring,
building and designing fault-tolerant workflows systems. The concept of communication-
closed layer provides a mechanisms to decompose any given workflow system
into a set of a "basic” atomic actions. Furthermore, as a result of this decompo-
sition, the new quasi-sequential flow may be looked upon as a "planned” systems
which is designed explicitly as a set of "planned atomic activities”.
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Figure 5.2 – Layer’s Atomicity Structure
A planned system is often referred to as "atomic systems”. We should note here
that the layer structure does not allow for what is known as "spontaneous” atomic
actions that arise the dynamic sequences of events occurring in the system - i.e. be-
havioures. This is because the property of communication closeness layer delimits
any error propagation caused by interprocess communication. It also support the
idea of error conferment.
5.6.1 Error Recovery in the Layer Structure
It is well known that an error in a workflow corresponds to an inconsistent be-
haviour of its constituents activities. These behaviours may take the forms of
unexpected termination or an erroneous communication attempt. It should be re-
alised that if computation is successful, provisions for fault tolerance within a
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layer are invisible to the rest of the layers. This leads to encapsulation of such
measures in a rather modular fashion (we call this sub-layering).
Additionally, and as pointed out in [86], the specification of a layer is constituted
by the relationship between the states at the beginning and the termination of the
layer.
5.6.2 Recovery Procedure
Let us assume that an error, E, has occurred at a layer Li. A typical recovery
procedure may be informally described as follows: For each layer there is what
shall be called "Layer-Handler”. A "Layer-Handler” acts as a local handler for
this layer (as depicted in Fig(5.3)).
P Q
L
1
Save
Commit
E
forward recovery
Rollback to the top
E
Handler
Error exception
Figure 5.3 – Layer with Error Handlers
At the boundary of a layer, say Li and before the execution resumes, it is assumed
that all states are saved. We also assume that a local handler, Hi, exists for each
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layer and that it has the necessary software that can be invoked to attempt correct-
ing E. If this attempt is successful, then the flow will resume at the subsequent
layer, i.e., Li+1, otherwise the computation is rolled back to a previously saved
consistent state. However, if a failure persists to occurs after the resumption in all
layers above, then the whole application must be aborted. Aborting computation
occur only when failure happens at the most outer layer. Further, in case of nested
layers, the following philosophy for error recovery is adopted. Any internal layer
should have its own private ("local”) handler which deal with any exception raised
by any of its threads. If the exception can not be handled internally, then it must
be raised in its containing layer (this is known as "layer-failure”) and by all of its
threads. However if different exceptions are raised by more than one thread of a
layer and at least one can not be handled locally, a layer-failure should be raised.
5.6.3 Backward Error Recovery
Backward error recovery techniques can be realised within our layer structure.
We closely follow established mechanisms that are reported in Liskov [87, 88]
and Baiardi [18]. In our layer structure, the top boundary of every layer acts as a
recovery line for backward error recovery mechanisms. As we mentioned above,
as control enters the recovery line, all states are saved 5. Therefore in case of an
error, a mechanism must be establish to undo the whole layer with, for example,
5This resembles a stable storage techniques.
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the invocation of an alternative method for that particular layer. Techniques such
as N-Version programming may be adopted.
Note that the saved state at the top boundary of a layer can, in case of errors, be
restored before the resumption of recovery mechanisms. We can achieve this by
parametrising the layer itself. The parameters play a similar role to the formal
parameter list in a procedure/function/method environment.
5.6.4 Forward Error Recovery
For forward error recovery we aim to remove or isolate a specific fault. Obvi-
ously, this requires the correct identification of the fault and the erroneous state of
the layer which has been corrupted before proceeding with further processing. It
has become a common practice to use exception handling mechanisms in dealing
with these types of errors. The local handler (which is a sub-layer) cope with all
exceptions raised in this layer. A classification of errors should be identified and
for each class of error, there should be an exception value which once raised by
any activity then all other activities are made aware of the exception. Otherwise,
if no exceptions are raised, the layer is considered to terminate successfully.
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5.7 Summary
Motivated by the fact that workflows can be highly distributed with timing, secu-
rity and context constraints, we have developed a design language, CS−F low,
where "context” is a first class citizen and that "guards” provide expressive tool
for security and context requirements. This has obviated the need to have extra
and specialised language to express security policies. The language was given a
specification-oriented semantics in a process algebraic style. We have also given
equational characterisation to the language. Such algebraic laws are useful tools
to manipulate, at a textual level, CS−F low systems.
Given this background, it was important to devise a methodology for the develop-
ment and analysis of CS−F low workflow. For this, we have introduced the con-
cept of "communication-closed” layers which is a logical structure that transform
a given CS−F low system into a semantically equivalent one which is easier to
analyse. The resulting system is quasi-sequential and is a composition of a num-
ber of communication-closed layers. For a layer to be communication-closed, a
communication must start and terminates within the layer itself. In other words,
communications do not cross the boundary of layers. The composition of lay-
ers could be purely sequential, ; n1 {Li}, or purely in a non-deterministic fashion,
2n1 {Gi → Li}. Once a layer is constructed, we can apply various algebraic laws
to resolve, e.g. communication and interference that render the analysis easier.
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Having introduced the layer concept as an analysis tool, we have devised a de-
velopment methodology of CS−F low system. In such a methodology, we de-
compose requirements into layer-requirements, develop each layer then integrate
layers to form the traditional and conventional CS−F low system. As part of fu-
ture work, we could explore the idea having a layer as a syntactic construct and
some static analyses to be done at compilation time.
As timing issues are central to many workflows, we have argued that communication-
closed layer can be extended to become "time-closed” layer where time constrains
the way we construct the layers themselves. A layer is called "closed” if and only
if it is both time- and communication-closed.
We have ended the chapter by elaborating on how the layer design can serve as
a mechanism for developing fault-tolerant CS−F low system. This is because of
atomicity property that we get for free from the fact layers are communication-
closed. To this end, backward and forward error recovery techniques can be de-
ployed for each layer.
Next chapter we deal with tool support that enables us to execute/animate CS−F low
system. The tool only serves as a proof of concept.
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Chapter 6
CS−F low
ANIMATION and VALIDATION
Objectives
• Provide reduction rules for CS−F low activities.
• Process Algebraic-Style Semantics for CS−F low.
• Provide a description for practical support for CS−F low
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe the reduction rules for CS−F low activities. Reduc-
tion rules describe how an activity can be executed in a step-by-step fashion and
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are used as the basis for validating (animating) by exploring various scenarios of
designs/models of CS−F low system.
Being a process algebra, computation is not possible within CCA. The focus
there was on the animation of context, context-awareness and mobility. Indeed,
simple operations such as ≤, ≥, etc, are not supported in its execution environ-
ment. Therefore, the CCA execution environment was modified to include vari-
ables, usual arithmetic operations, timing issues as well as priorities constructs.
In this chapter we give an encoding of CS−F low to be suitable of execution to-
gether with few illustrative examples. The chapter is organised as follows. In
Section (6.2), we give the reduction rules for CS−F low, the encoding process
of CS−F low is given in Section (6.3), with few illustrative examples in Section
(6.3). In Sections (6.3.6) and (6.3.7), two directives to control the execution of
CS−F low programs are described. Finally, some examples of executions are
shown in Section(6.4).
6.2 CS−F low Reduction Rules
Reduction rules serve two purposes. Rules allows us to understand how an activity
within a workflow are executed; and the operational semantics of any language is
often defined using a structural congruence ≡ and a reduction relation →. The
structural congruence for CS−F low was given as an algebraic characterisation
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Table 6.1 – Reduction Rules-1
P→ P′ ⇒ var x˜ in {P }→ var x˜ in {P′ } (Reduction Var)
P→ P′ ⇒ chan x˜ in {P }→ chan x˜ in {P′ } (Reduction Chan)
P→ P′ ⇒ α < x˜ >: {P}→ α < x˜ >: {P′} (Reduction Contxt)
P→ P′ ⇒ C (P)→ C (P′) (Reduction Contxt)
P→ P′ ⇒ P ‖Q→ P′ ‖Q (Reduction Par)
P≡ Q, Q→ Q′, Q′ ≡ P′ ⇒ P → P′ (Reduction ≡)
in Chapter(4) (page 119). These laws also allow us to manipulate the structure of
activities at textual level, i.e. it can be the bases of a term re-writing tool.
We use the customary notation P{y˜← z˜} for the substitution of each name in
the list z˜ for each free occurrence of the corresponding name in the list y˜. Obvi-
ously, such a substitution is only defined if | y˜ | = | z˜ | . The reduction
relation of activities is defined in Table(6.1) and Table(6.2).
6.3 Encoding CS−F low Activities
The transformation from CS−F low to ccaPL is given below.
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Table 6.2 – Reduction Rules-2
(Chan ? y˜) ; P ‖ (Chan ! z˜) ; Q
→ P{y˜← z˜} ‖ Q (Reduction Com-1)
α : {((Chan ? y˜) ; P) ‖ Q} ‖ β : {((Chan ! z˜) ; R) ‖ S}
→ α : {P(y˜← z˜) ‖ Q} ‖ β : {R ‖ S} (Reduction Com-2)
α : ((Chan ? y˜) ; P) ‖ Q) ‖ β : (α : (Chan ! z˜) ; R) ‖ S)
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜)) ‖ β : (R‖ S) (Reduction Com-3)
α : (β : (Chan ? y˜ ; P) ‖ Q) ‖ β : (Chan ! z˜ ; R) ‖ S
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜) ‖ Q) ‖ β(R ‖ S) (Reduction Com-4)
α : (β : (Chan ? y˜ ; P) ‖ Q) ‖ β : (α : ((Chan ! z˜ ; R ‖ S))
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜) ‖ Q) ‖ β(R ‖ S) (Reduction Com-5)
β : {to(α) . P ‖ Q} ‖ (α : {R})
→ α : {β : {P ‖ Q} R} (Reduction Mob)
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6.3.1 Variables
A variable x in CS−F low will be treated as a memory cell and is modelled by
the following process abstract where v is the initial value of the variable x:
proc mem(x, v) {
x[
send(v).0
| !@recv().recv(w).{ @send(w).0 | send(w).0 }
| !@recv(u).recv(y).{ @send().0 | send(u).0 }
]
}
To read the value of a variable x into the the name n use the process:
x#send().x#recv(n)
To write a value t in a variable x, use the process:
x#send(t).x#recv()
6.3.2 Channels
A channel c is modelled as an ambient of name c. Communication over channels
is modelled below. In what follows we show how both primitive and compound
activities be modelled.
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6.3.3 Primitive Activities
Here we give the encoding of the primitive activities of CS−F low.
skip =̂ 0
x := v ; P =̂ x#send(v).x#recv().P
c ! v ; P =̂ c[@send(v).0] . P
c ? v ; P =̂ c#recv(v).del c.P
α : {P} =̂ α [P]
to(α); P =̂ new m {
m[@send().0]
| <somewhere (α[this | true] | true)>m#recv().del m.out.P
| in α.m#recv().del m.P
}
var x in P =̂ new x { P | mem(x,0) }
chan c in P =̂ new c P
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6.3.4 Compound Activities
The encoding of the compound activities are as follows.
P ‖ Q =̂ P | Q
while G.P =̂ new x {
x[@send().0]
| <not G>x#recv().del x.0
| ! <G>x#recv().del x.P.x[@send().0]
}
p1 : G1→ P 2 p2 : G2→ P =̂ new x {
x[@send().0]
| <(G1 and not G2) or (
G1 and G2 and p1>=p2)>x#recv().del x.P
| <(G2 and not G1) or (
G2 and G1 and p2>=p1)>x#recv().del x.Q
}
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delay(t); P =̂ new clock new m {
clock[send(0).0 | !@recv().recv(w).
{@send(w).0 | send(w+1).0}]
| m[@send().0]
| !m#recv().clock#recv().clock#recv(x).{
<x=t>del m.P
| <not(x=t)>del m.m[@send().0]
}
}
6.3.5 Encoding the guards
true =̂ true
¬ E =̂ not E
E1∧E2 =̂ E1 and E2
E1∨E2 =̂ E1or E2
somewhere(α).E =̂ G α E
6.3.6 Execution directives
As we mentioned above, there are two directives to control the execution of
CS−F low programs: mode and display.
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1. Mode: This handles the way concurrent and non-deterministic activities are
executed. As activities in a model are executed concurrently in an interleav-
ing manner, the directive mode specifies the strategy for fair execution of
these activities 1. mode takes a unique parameter random: mode random.
With random, the activity to be executed is chosen randomly from the list
of enabled activities. A pseudo random number generator with uniform
distribution is assumed.
However, when this directive is not specified, the default execution mode
is assumed (deterministically): i.e. at each execution step the activity to
execute is chosen based on two criteria:
• how long the activity has been willing to execute (first-in, first-out),
otherwise,
• in case of conflict, sequential order of the text is used.
2. Display: This directive determines how the execution trace is displayed:
• display code — Displays the model (without comments) after each
reduction.
1Activity fairness means that if an activity is allowed to be executed infinitely often then that
activity is also executed infinitely often. In other words, an enabled activity cannot wait indefi-
nitely to be executed. So each activity must be given a fair chance of being executed.
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• display congruence — Displays, in addition to reduction steps (de-
noted by -->), the congruence steps (denoted by <-->).
• By default code and congruence are not displayed in output, only re-
duction steps are.
6.3.7 Notations
In general, the following notations are used:
• The symbol ‘<-->’ corresponds to the structural congruence relation as for-
mally defined in Chapter 4 (page 119).
• ‘-->’ represents the reduction relation (see Table (6.2) and (6.1))
• The explanation of each transition is given between a pair of curly brackets.
• The notation ‘A ==X==> B’ means that a context ‘A’ has sent a message ‘X’
to another context ‘B’.
• Additional annotations such as ‘Child to parent’ and ‘Sibling to sibling’
provide information about the relationship between the sender ‘A’ and the
receiver ‘B’. This is only available if the user choose to put structure on
contexts.
• The notation {binding: n -> IN1} corresponds to the execution of a ac-
tivity of the form “find n:k for ...” and means that the variable n has
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been bound to the name IN1.
6.4 Interface and Examples
As a proof-of-concept, we have built a simple environment within which we can
validate/animate our specification/design. As customary, the environment consists
of an interface and an execution engine.
The interface is simple and offers basic features such as file, Edit, etc. and linked
with the execution environment which is responsible for executing/animating CS−F low
design. In Figures((6.1), (6.2) & (6.3)), illustrates such an interface through some
screen shots.
Figure 6.1 – CS−F low: Front Screen
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This interface allows us the normal operations: open/edit a file and be ready to
execute as shown below in Figure(6.2).
Figure 6.2 – CS−F low: Menues
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Figure(6.3) shows an example.
Figure 6.3 – CS−F low: Editing
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The following illustrates the execution environment using some of our working
examples.
6.4.1 Example 1: a One-Place Buffer
Let us recall the one-place buffer example given in Section(5.4.1). We recall that
a one-place buffer is a data structure that operates through two actions push and
pull, respectively putting one item in the buffer and taking one item from it. The
buffer is full when it contains one item. It is impossible to put one item into a full
buffer; it is impossible to take one item from the empty buffer.
CS−F low model is first presented and followed by its execution form and
animation.
Buffer =̂
push ? x ;
empty := false ;
while true
do
{
empty → push ? x
2
not empty → pull ! v ;
empty := true
}
od
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BEGIN_DECLS 
 
END_DECLS 
 
proc buffer(buf){ 
   buf[@recv(x).send(x).0 | !recv(y).@send(y).@recv(z).send(z).0] 
} 
 
//this process pushes the value v onto the buffer buf. 
 
| proc push(v, buf){ 
   buf#send(v) 
} 
 
| proc pull(buf){ 
   buf#recv(x).send(x).0 
} 
 | buffer(A) // create a buffer named A 
 | buffer(B) // create a buffer named B 
 | push(8,A) // push the value 8 onto the buffer A 
 | pull(A)  // pull the value in the buffer A 
 | recv(t).  // get the value in the variable t 
   push(t,B).0 // and push that value onto the buffer B. 
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     ****************************************** 
     **    csFlow Interpreter version 2.7                         ** 
     **            April 2012                                                    ** 
     ****************************************** 
Execution mode: interleaving 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "buffer" in the context "root"} 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "buffer" in the context "root"} 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "push" in the context "root"} 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "pull" in the context "root"} 
--->  {Parent to child: root ===(8)===> A} 
--->  {Local: A ===(8)===> A} 
--->  {Child to parent: A ===(8)===> root} 
--->  {Local: root ===(8)===> root} 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "push" in the context "root"} 
--->  {Parent to child: root ===(8)===> B} 
--->  {Local: B ===(8)===> B} 
Figure 6.4 – CS−F low: buffer-output
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6.4.2 Example 2: Adaptable activities On Shop-floor
We recall the "Adaptable Activities” discussed in Section(3.5.2), page 105. In the
scenario, a context-aware system that enables a mobile software agent to edit/view
a text/image file on any host device using an appropriate text/image editor for
that device’s operating system. Here we repeat a fraction of the specification
to ease readability: Let’s use win and Linx to denote context running Windows
and Linux, respectively. Each of these contexts contains an activity abstraction
edit that maps to the default text editor and the mobile agent just has to call that
activity abstraction to edit a file using the local text editor as specified below. Our
ShopFloor is specified as a context which has two devices: win and linx:
ShopFloor :
{
win ‖ linx
}
The Linux device is specified as
linx :
{
var f in edit
{
emacs(f )
}
}
The corresponding execution form when the host is linx is given as follows.
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lin[
proc edit(f) {
emacs(f).0
}
|
agent[
@edit(foo).0
]
]
6.4.3 Example 3: Mobility
In this example, we have three contexts, A, B, and C. Upon receiving a message,
msg0 from B, context A moves into B and while it is there, it waits until receiving
a message, msg1 from C and then moves there. Once it is there it terminates.
The model is first shown in CS−F low and followed by its execution form and
animation.
BEGIN_DECLS
mode random
display code
display congruence // add this line to include congruence
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END_DECLS
A[B:: recv(msg0).in B.0]
| B[A:: send(msg0) . C:: recv(msg1).in C.0]
| C[B:: send(msg1).0]
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Execution mode: interleaving 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      A[ B::recv(msg0).in B.0 ] 
   |  
      B[ A::send(msg0).C::recv(msg1).in C.0 ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {Sibling to sibling: B ===(msg0)===> A} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      A[ in B.0 ] 
   |  
      B[ C::recv(msg1).in C.0 ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {ambient "A" moves into ambient "B"} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      B[  
            A[ 0 ] 
         |  C::recv(msg1).in C.0 
      ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {Sibling to sibling: C ===(msg1)===> B} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      B[  
            A[ 0 ] 
         |  in C.0 
      ] 
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Execution mode: random 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      A[ B::recv(msg0).in B.0 ] 
   |  
      B[ A::send(msg0).C::recv(msg1).in C.0 ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {Sibling to sibling: B ===(msg0)===> A} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      A[ in B.0 ] 
   |  
      B[ C::recv(msg1).in C.0 ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {ambient "A" moves into ambient "B"} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      B[  
            A[ 0 ] 
         |  C::recv(msg1).in C.0 
      ] 
   |  
      C[ B::send(msg1).0 ]  
 
--->  {Sibling to sibling: C ===(msg1)===> B} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      B[  
            A[ 0 ] 
         |  in C.0 
      ] 
   |  
Figure 6.5 – CS−F low: hello-new
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6.4.4 Example 4: Variable declaration
The following example demonstrates the declaration of variables and how they
are assigned values:
/*
test example
display code
*/
BEGIN_DECLS
display code
END_DECLS
proc mem(x, v) {
x[
send(v).0
| !@recv().recv(w).{ @send(w).0 | send(w).0 }
| !@recv(u).recv(y).{ @send().0 | send(u).0 }
]
}
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|
mem(myVar, 200).0
|
myVar#send(1500).myVar#recv().
myVar#send().myVar#recv(n).myValueIs(n).0
//|
//x#send(t).x#recv()
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Execution mode: interleaving 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      proc mem(x,v) { 
            x[  
                  send(v).0 
               |  ! @recv().recv(w).{ 
                                 @send(w).0 
                              |  send(w).0 
                           } 
               |  ! @recv(u).recv(y).{ 
                                 @send().0 
                              |  send(u).0 
                           } 
            ] 
      } 
   |  mem(myVar,200).0 
   |  
myVar#send(1500).myVar#recv().myVar#send().myVar#recv(n).myValueIs(n).
0  
 
--->  {local call to the abstraction "mem" in the ambient "root"} 
  
 BEGIN_DECLS 
 
 
 END_DECLS 
  
      myVar[  
            send(200).0 
         |  ! @recv().recv(w).{ 
                           @send(w).0 
                        |  send(w).0 
                     } 
         |  ! @recv(u).recv(y).{ 
                           @send().0 
                        |  send(u).0 
                     } 
      ] 
   |  
      proc mem(x,v) { 
            x[  
                  send(v).0 
               |  ! @recv().recv(w).{ 
                                 @send(w).0 
                              |  send(w).0 
                           } 
Figure 6.6 – CS−F low: Variables
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6.5 Summary
We have introduced CS−F low that overcame the limitations that exist in current
workflow languages and which meet the need for the specification, modelling and
design of modern workflow system. Namely, CS−F low has a provision
• for context-awareness (to meet the pervasive nature of current workflow),
• to deal with security issues and
• to have the ability to explicitly express timing issues which exist in many, if
not all current workflow systems.
We have also given a process algebraic-style semantics to CS−F low. Such se-
mantics is denotational in nature as it describes the behaviour of an activity as a
process term in a novel context aware process calculus known as CCA. The choice
of CCA, as a base formalism, was due to the fact that it is the closest process algebra
that satisfy our requirements. We have also given an algebraic characterisation to
CS−F low activities and have derived important reduction rule for them The later
allows us to execute a model in CS−F low. The former allows us to manipulate
terms in CS−F low. Further, we have extended the execution environment of CCA
to provide a tool support for CS−F low. In the next chapter we present a realistic
case study as an illustration and evaluation to our formalism. This is namely the
next generation of Context-Aware (hospital) Ward CAW .
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Chapter 7
CS−F low
THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM:
The CAW system
Objectives
• Evaluate our formalism on a realistic case study.
• Evaluate Health care systems workflow of some scenarios.
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the evaluation phase of the work presented here. The
evaluation takes two complementary strands:
• animation of CS−F low’s models and specifications and
• formal verification of time-critical component of workflows.
To facilitate this evaluation, we have chosen a case study from the health care
domain. Health care provides huge amounts of business workflows, which will
benefit from workflow adaptation and support through pervasive computing sys-
tems. Several of these workflows have to be performed regularly. For example,
we find workflows, such as "Hand-out Medication”, "Ordering Drugs”, "Review
EPRs” and much more. These workflows are central for successfully and effi-
ciently running hospitals and/or nursing homes. The interpersonal relationships
between hospital staff (doctors, nurses, support staff, etc) in these organisation are
equally crucial and essential in addition to the provision of the daily health care
services. These interpersonal relationships require time to both develop and main-
tain but, more often than not, medical staff’s time is consumed by organizational
and administrative tasks rather than "care”. For that reason there is a great need
for improving the day-to-day activities of workflows by utilising current advances
in technology. It is also important to note that workflows within health care do-
main is in fact inherently security-critical and context-aware. Accessing patient’s
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record must be done by appropriately authorised staff, the level of access varies
according to the role a particular staff is holding (a Sargent or a consultant, for
example will have full access to medical records whilst a nurse may not). In ad-
dition, as medical records take a variety of forms: textual (e.g., list of medication,
description of diagnoses, etc.) and images (e.g., x-rays). These records need to be
accessed (and some cases edited) on various devices with different operating sys-
tems and applications. In addition, some activities within health care workflows
may be time-critical, of a periodic nature and highly distributed across various
hospital departments and between different hospitals and non-health care organi-
zations (e.g., insurance companies, financial organisations, law-enforcement de-
partments, etc.). We begin by outlining briefly the current status of a ward in a
typical hospital (Section (7.2)). Then in Section (7.3), we describe typical work-
flow scenarios in any ward (current or next generation). This is followed by a
detail CS−F low specification/models for the next generation of hospital wards
(Section ( 7.4)).
7.2 Current Status
The current activities for intensive care include the following obvious tasks. A
typical hospital ward (or nursing home) has an average number of patients/inhab-
itants in need of particular services (a realistic population in an average nursing
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home is around 100 patients and inhabitants, each with a particular diagnosis).
These common every day services consist of activities such as: (a) specific med-
ication needs, (b) personal hygiene, (c) the preparation of meals with focusing
on special diets, (c) managing the laundry, etc. There is also a set of trained
professionals with different abilities (nurses, care-takers, medics etc.) each with
different schedules and working times.
A workflow can be assigned to a patient/inhabitant, trying to fulfill optimal care
for him/her, rescheduling appointments (e.g. with a consultant/doctor, therapies,
according to the physician orders or other services that satisfy their specific per-
sonal needs), and furthermore informing the nursing staff about patient needs.
Other workflows can be specifically attached to the nurses, caretakers or physi-
cians. Basically, all tasks in the patient care are performed in interpersonal inter-
action between the nurse and the patients assigned to this particular nurse. The
way the tasks are performed is mainly regulated by a host of quality metrics and
targets. There is also a care handbook that contains basic instructions of how a
nurse has to deal with a patient to ensure high level quality of treatment and their
correctness (i.e. correct medication to the a specified patient/inhabitant).
Until now the documentation, in many places, is performed using a paper-based
technique and the belongings of the patients (such as medication, sweets, drinks,
etc.) are stored in a basket-system (one basket per person). Improvements in
workflows such as for documentation, or automating the documentation of hy-
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giene care using bar codes techniques, etc. are very timely and will be very wel-
comed by staff and patients alike. Whilst improvements were often thought about
yet never implemented for a variety of reasons (e.g., financial constraints, poli-
cy/decision makers and/or lack of a thorough understanding of its requirements).
In this chapter we do not aim to undertake the specification, modelling and anal-
ysis of a complete health care workflow system, but consider only a fraction of it,
namely the medication scenario. In this scenario there are different types of work-
flows. Besides the workflows that specifies the act of nursing, such as handing out
medications, there are logistic workflows such as ordering drugs.
A reason for choosing the medication scenario is as follows
• it comprises different separate workflows that are linked together and partly
depending on each other,
• medication can clearly be related to the act of nursing itself which carries
varies access control, authentication and privacy constraints,
• medication (with its workflows) is one clearly defined unit which is not
influenced by other workflows outside of medication, and
• the scenario has timing constraints as the scenario is repeated within a fixed
time period.
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7.3 The composition of the Medication Scenario
As we mentioned earlier, there are a number of workflows that constitute the med-
ication scenario. these are:
• Drug ordering,
• Drug expiry date check,
• Preparation for Daily Medication,
• Handing out Daily Medication and
• Handing out Medication on Demand
In this section we give a general description of each of the above and this is fol-
lowed by a detailed specification and modelling of a context aware ward where
all of these workflows are performed in (Section 7.4).
WF-1: Drug ordering
Drugs are normally stored in labeled trays which are stacked up in air-
conditioned storage room whose temperature is carefully monitored. Order-
ing drugs is a workflow which basically has two complementary activities
("check stock of drugs” and "order drugs”), which are performed together
in one workflow. Checking the stock of drugs is currently performed by a
senior nurse who compares the need of specific medicines for the next time
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period (until the next check of stock) with the number of drugs exists in its
storage tray. If the number of drugs in storage is below the needed drugs in
the next time period, the medicine has to be ordered. The calculation has to
take into account the ordering and delivery time. In addition, there might
be specific constraints for every ward, hospital or care home (e.g. time, day,
quantity of orders and specialised pharmacists).
WF-2: Drug expiry date check
It is obviously clear that "Ordering drugs” is activated if there is a shortage
in the available drug or some of the existing drugs are out-of-date. Therefore
checking drug’s expiry date is a workflow that is seen as part of the ordering
workflow, as the expiry of drugs influences the stock of drugs and hence the
requirement of ordering drugs. The check for expiry date is performed at a
regular periodic intervals (in some places, once every month). However, it is
not performed within every drug ordering activity. Nevertheless we have to
emphasis the dependency of this workflow to the ordering drugs workflow.
Checking the expiry dates are often performed by a senior nurse and an
advice from a consultant may be sought.
WF-3: Preparation of daily medications
The preparation of the daily medication (for all patients/inhabitants) is done
in the previous night (often by the night nurse). This is because of efficiency
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reason, as it will save time during the daily activities of the ward. So, during
the day the nurses in the early- and late-shifts do not have to check for all
medications and prepare them. Drugs which are not available or out-of-date
can not be prepared.
There should be mechanisms and/or procedures in place to ensure the cor-
rect preparation of drugs. Human errors are likely to occur (specially at the
end of a night shift) and hence a nurse supervisors perform various checks
that ensure the correct preparation of drugs.
Again this workflow is part of the whole medication workflow and it de-
pends on the correct drug ordering and checking expiry date workflows.
WF-4: Handing out of daily medications:
The nurse hands out the medication to the patients at breakfast, lunch, din-
ner and during the night taking into account the patients’ needs and the pre-
scriptions of the doctors and/or consultants. This workflow, the handing out
of the medication is repeated several times a day. It depends on an efficient
preparation of daily medication and on a successful ordering of drugs.
WF-5: Handing out medications on demand
There are many cases where the status of patients/inhabitants has changed
and required a different medication which had been prescribed by doctors/-
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consultants. In such situation medication has to be handed out on demand.
Contrasting this with other medication workflows, this workflow is not per-
formed periodically. It might be executed several times a day or even only
once. Again this workflow depends on a successful ordering of drugs, which
means that the drugs have to be available on demand. Clearly, it affects and
influence the ordering of drugs, as it is difficult to estimate the number of
needed on-demand drugs for the next time period. A stock which is too
large could cause an unnecessary expiration of the drugs and running out
of on-demand medication could possibly cause a crisis. Therefore proper
interaction between this workflow and the drug-ordering workflow is very
important.
7.4 Next Generation Context-Aware Ward: CAW
As we mentioned earlier, the above workflows are general to both traditional and
the next generation wards. In this section, we specify what we call the next genera-
tion Context-aware (hospital) Ward (CAW ); in particular, we consider the work-
flows: "Handing out Medication” and "Handing out Medication on Demand”,
given in Section (7.3) and Section (7.3) (page 226). These are partly considered in
the Hospital of the Future project at the Centre for Pervasive Health Care, [19,20].
This case study was particularly chosen because it represents a realistic and real-
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world application of workflow in health care. It also has specific and important
characteristics, namely, it is
• context-aware;
• security-critical and
• time-critical.
workflow system in health care environment.
In CAW , every bed (see Figure (7.1) is
• computerised with a touch display screen for
– patients so they can simply touch the screen for entertainment pur-
poses (watching television, DVD, play games and listening to radio)
and
– medical staff (nurses, doctors and consultants) so they can access med-
ical data (x-rays, analysis, medication and/or historical health records)
while working at the bed.
• aware of who is using it (i.e. the identity of the patient and staff). For
example, the bed is aware of the nurse, the patient and the medicine tray;
• runs a context-aware Electronic Patient Record (EPR) client which commu-
nicate with a server which is reside in the hospital or near-by;
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• according to the locations and access right of the nurse, patient and medicine tray,
the bed can
– automatically log in the nurse,
– find the patient record,
– display the medication records,
– display the current prescribed medication which is in the pill container;
and
– automatically logged out the nurse/medical staff once they leaves, what
is known as the bed zone1 of the bed.
• the bed is also aware of all other environment changes that occur within its
bed zone; for example, cleaning, inspection times, food time, etc.
This mechanism of "logging in” and "logging out” a user based on its proximity
is called proximity-based user authentication [19, 20].
1Sometimes known as active zone.
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Figure 7.1 – Context-Aware ward [19, 20]
As discussed in [20], context is more than location in a hospital setting. For
example, the nurse documenting the medicine needs not be located close to the
patient, even though this patient is definitely part of her work context. Moreover,
(as we mentioned earlier) the patient’s EPR2 may be stored on a remote server
but still provides valuable context information about the patient condition and
treatment.
Here, we consider six contexts: these are
2Electronic Patient Record
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1. bed,
2. patient,
3. nurse,
4. medicine tray,
5. pill container and
6. bed zone.
Each of these entities is represented by a context in CS−F low.
Initially, the bed is located in its bed zone, the patient is inside the bed, and the
nurse and medicine tray containing the pill containers are outside the bed zone
of the bed. This is modelled as follows. Let Pi be the activity describing the be-
haviour of the contexti and let pati denotes the ith patient. The frame 〈pati, a˜i〉
denotes the medications, ai needed by patient pati.
Summary of the frames of these contexts are given in Table(7.1)
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Table 7.1 – Contexts Frames
Frames Context Frames Context
x˜n Nurse x˜t Tray
W˜ Bed W˜1 Patient
W˜2 Nurse Room W˜3 Medicine Room
(pat_1, a˜1), · · · (pat_n, a˜n) n Drug containers
There is a number of channels which are used by the contexts and their activities.
the following table, Table(7.2), summaries the name of these channels.
Table 7.2 – Channels: (a ↪→ b) means a to b
Channels Contexts Channels Contexts
chann.t Nurse ↪→ Tray chant.n Tray ↪→ Nurse
chanpc.az Pill container ↪→ Active zone chanpb Patient ↪→ bed
chanbp bed ↪→ patient
7.5 The CAW System
In this section we systematically develop the CAW system. The overall workflow
of ward, CAW , is given as follows:
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(7.1)
CAW =̂

nurse 〈x˜n〉 : {Pn}
‖bed〈w˜〉 : {Pb}
‖patient 〈w˜1〉 : {Pp}
‖nurse−office 〈w˜2〉 : {Pn.o}
‖medicine− room 〈w˜3〉 : {Pm.r}
‖
tray 〈x˜t〉 : {Pt ‖ Cont1 〈pat1, a˜1〉 : {P1} ‖ Cont2 〈pat2, a˜2〉 : {P2}‖ · · · · · · · · ·
‖ Contk 〈patk, a˜k〉 : {Pk}
}


where Px is an activity specifying the behaviour of its host context.
7.5.1 The Nurse Context
The nurse
• can be in or out of the bed zone as often as needed in the course of her work
activities;
• once inside the bed zone, the nurse can access the patient EPR using the
touch screen embedded in the bed.
• brings the medicine tray as s/he enters and take it out as s/he leaves the bed
zone;
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• hands out the daily medication and handing out medication on demand (as
described in Section (7.3) (page 226).
We note that
• "bringing medicine tray with him/her” requires a synchronisation between
the activities representing the nurse and the activity modelling the medicine
tray.
• the activity of handing out medication occurs at a regular intervals. The
periodic activity given in Section (3.5) (page 102) can be utilised.
So the behaviour of the nurse can be modelled as follows:
(7.2) Pn =̂ chan chann.t in

while true
chann.t ! any ;
to(bed) ;
[epr(Pi) ‖ HandOutDrug(Pi)]
chann.t ! any ;
to(nurse−office)

where, given a period (T ), deadline (D), and number of periods (N), such that
D≤ T ,
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(7.3)
HandOutDrug =̂ var T, D, N, i in

while i ≤ N
do
([T ]([D]GiveDrug) ‖ delay(T) ) ;
i = i + 1
od

7.5.2 The Tray Context
As we mentioned above, as the nurse goes in/out of the bed zone with the purpose
of administering medication, it signals that fact to the tray context so as to follow
the nurse (note that medicine in the tray context is stored in the pill containers
context). So the tray context communicates with the nurse context to know when
to move in and out the bed zone. This is modelled as follows and the explanation
is similar to that of the nurse context.
(7.4) Pt =̂ chan chann.t in

while true
chann.t ? any ;
to(bed) ;
epr(Pi) ;
chann.t ? any ;
to(medicine− room)

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7.5.3 The Pill Container Context
The name of the patient will be identified to the pill container by lighting the
patient’s name. For example, if the pill container coni, for some i such that 1 ≤
i≤ k, contains the medicine of the patient named patient_001, then the behaviour
of the pill container is specified as follows:
(7.5)
Pi =̂ chan chanpc.c in

while true
do
somewhere(pt) → chanpc.c ! ′patient_001′
od

To model this communication, Pt is modified as follows, to enable communication
between the tray context and the pill container contexts:
(7.6) Pt =̂ chan chann.t, chanpc.c in

while true
chann.t ? any ;
chanpc.c ? pname ;
to(bed) ;
epr(Pi) ;
chann.t ? any ;
to(medicine− room)

The tray activity is now able to receive messages from the pill container context it
contains. This name, in turns can be propagated/broadcast to other context using
(see our Swift-Cabs Ltd in Section(3.5.5, on page 111)
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channt ! pname ‖ chanpc.c ! pname ‖ · · ·
7.5.4 The Patient Context
The patient context selects an entertainment program by sending a request to the
bed context as follows:
(7.7) Pp =̂ chan chanP.b,chanb.p in
 while truechanp.b ! request ‖
chanb.p ? display

The freshness of a request is guaranteed by the tight synchronisation model.
7.5.5 The Bed Context
One of the most important context-awareness properties of the bed is the ability of
logging the nurse in when s/he enters the bed zone and logging her/him out when
s/he leaves that zone, automatically. This is modelled as follows:
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(7.8)
Pb =̂

while(true) do {
not somewhere(ActiveZone) → logout(n)) ; (a)
2
somewhere(ActiveZone) and epr(req,p(i)) → login(n) (b)
}

The context-guarded capability in Eq. (7.8)-a says that when the nurse enter the
bed’s bed zone, the activity ‘login〈nurse〉’ is taken to log the nurse in the EPR
system. The nurse is logged out when she leaves the bed zone as specified in Eq.
(7.8)-b.
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7.6 Verification
In this section we concentrate on the nurse context and in particular the HandOutDrug
activity described by the Equation(7.9) (page 239). For every six time units, within
two time units, the nurse reads the patient’s temperature, TempC, via a channel
read, and then updates s/his temperature record in Temp3. This behaviour is re-
peated four times daily. This periodic activity is specified as follows:
(7.9)
HandOutDrug =̂ i := 1; [6 × 4]

while i ≤ 4
do
[6]([2](read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC) ‖ delay(6)) ;
i = i + 1
od

The safety property that we need to proof is that the temperature is updated within
two time units, every six time units, four time daily:
Theorem 7.6.1
(7.10) SafetyProp =̂ every(6,within(2,P (t)))
Proof:
3The act of taking temperature can be considered as a special case of HandOutDrug.
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1. (def ,?,at)
(
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
)
|=
∨
σ ∈ [tα,tβ]
Temp at tβ = TempC
2. (1,Dur−1,&−2)

var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
}

|=
∨
σ ∈ [tα,tβ]
Temp at tβ = TempC
3. (2,dur−3,&−3a)

[2](var Temp, TempC,
chan read
in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})

|=
∨
σ ∈ [tα,tβ]
Temp at tβ = TempC
4. (dur−4)

[2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})

|= duration = 2
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5. (3,4,within−3a)

[2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})

|= within(2,P (t))
6. (dur−3) delay[6] |= durtion ≤ 6
7. (5,6,Dur−2)

([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6)

|= duration ≥ 6
8. (5,‖)

([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6)

|= within(2,P (t))
9. (8,Duration)

[6](([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6))

|= within(2,P (t))
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10. (7,Duration)

[6](([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6))

|= duration ≥ 6
11. (10,Dur−4)

[6](([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6))

|= duration ≤ 6
12. (10,11,and)

[6](([2](var Temp, TempC, chan read in
{
read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC
})) ‖ delay(6))

|= duration = 6
13. (9,12,every−4)

[6 × 4](while i ≤ 4
do [6]
([2] (read ? TempC ; Temp := TempC)
‖ delay(6)) ;
i := i + 1
od

|= every(6,within(2,P (t)))
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
The above demonstrates the systematic application of our timing proof system.
The property is an important example of a large class of safety properties given
the time-critical nature of many workflow systems. It is important to note that
integrating our proof system with the equational laws provides a powerful tool for
verification. A simple integration process can take the following form. Given a
CS−F low model, M and a property Prop
1. Apply algebraic laws to simplify the model and obtain an equivalent model
M′. Such an application could be a targeted to a known model.
2. Apply the proof system on M′
The automation of the laws and the proof system are feasible and are left for future
work.
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7.7 Summary
The quest for a case-study with the purpose of evaluating CS−F low is challeng-
ing. It is important however to elaborate on the precise meaning of "evaluation” of
a process algebra such as the one presented here. We take the view that the choice
of a case-study should be done to show key features of CS−F low; namely
• support concurrency;
• context and context awareness are first-class citizen;
• supports mobility as activities can move from one context to another;
• has the ability to express timing constrains: delay, deadlines, priority and
schedulability;
• allows the expressibility of (access control) security policies without the
need for an extra linguistic complexities; and
• enjoy sound formal semantics that allows us to animate design and compare
various designs.
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the use of CS−F low on a realistic case
study from the health care domain, namely the Context Aware Ward (CAW )
system. Workflows within health care domain is inherently security-critical and
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context-aware. Accessing patient’s record must be done by appropriately autho-
rised staff, the level of access varies according to the role a particular staff is
holding (a Sargent or a consultant, for example will have full access to medical
records whilst a nurse may not). In addition, as medical records take a variety of
forms: textual (e.g., list of medication, description of diagnoses, etc.) and images
(e.g., x-rays). These records need to be accessed (and some cases edited) on vari-
ous devices with different operating systems and applications.
In addition, some activities within health care workflows may be time-critical,
of a periodic nature and highly distributed across various hospital departments
and between different hospitals and non-health care organizations (e.g., insurance
companies, financial organisations, law-enforcement departments, etc.).
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
Objectives
• To summaries and conclude our findings and put it all in context with other related
work.
• Outline some future works to further advance the findings presented in the thesis.
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8.1 Introduction
The evolution of businesses occurs as a result of the evolution of the environments
within which they operate. The evolution of the environment can be technologi-
cally driven but can also be due to political, legislative and/or economic drivers:
mergers of businesses, changes in governments policies, economic crises, etc. are
few categories where environment may change. As a result, existing business pro-
cesses often need to be re-engineered (to add or remove functionalities, to migrate
systems to different platforms and/or languages, etc.) and to be optimised with
the view to reduce costs, deliver timely services, and to enhance their competitive
advantage in the market.
The philosophy of workflow technologies is to separate business policies/logics
from the underlying business applications, hence enhancing the evolution of their
processes and improving the re-engineering at the organisation level without the
need to delve into the application details.
Workflow technologies have been applied in variety of domains including
1. office automation,
2. finance and banking,
3. health-care,
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4. telecommunications,
5. military,
6. manufacturing and production.
We take the view that a workflow is a set of activities that achieve a common
business objective. These activities are coordinated/orchestrated statically or dy-
namically and may be carried out by humans, application programs, or processing
entities according to the organisational rules relevant to the process represented
by the workflow. Activities within a workflow are usually related and dependent
upon one another, which in turn are specified by a set of execution constraints such
as concurrency, serialization, exclusion, alternation, compensation and so on.
An activity therefore
• has a goal,
• has an input,
• has an output,
• performs in a particular order – e.g. in sequence/parallel/alternate with
others,
• is associated with a particular context – Contexts can be an organisation, a
device, a service (e.g. web-based service) or a computational environment,
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• has timing constraints,
• uses resources/information,
• may affect more than one organisation unit and
• properly terminates – in the same or in a different context 1.
For example, a workflow management system of a warehouse may have the fol-
lowing scenario: organises and controls the movement and storage of goods within
a warehouse. All of these must be performed within a timing constraint. This is
achieved through the definition and processing of complex transactions, including
charging, insurance-provision, shipping, receiving, put away, picking and deliver-
ing of goods.
When executing workflow, a large number of different participants can be in-
volved. These include, services and devices which may cross the boundaries
of various organisations. There could be a multitude of heterogeneous devices
ranging from resource-scarce sensor nodes, processor speed, capacity to powerful
mainframes. The purpose of these workflows is to support human users in an un-
obtrusive way. This implies that, for example, users should not be constrained in
their mobility. Users should always be able to interact with their workflows while
at the same time the complexity of the network and its undesired properties like
1This is an important aspect of an activity as it impacts on and raises challenging issues regard-
ing security and timing behaviours of an activity
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e.g. intermittent communication links should be handled transparently. However,
in networks that support mobility, devices and services may join or leave the net-
work at all times and the quality of communication links may change over time.
In order to support the accessibility of workflows in the face of intermittent com-
munication links, to ensure the performance of the interactions in spite of varying
link quality and to use the resources of the network efficiently, it is necessary to
distribute a workflow in the network with respect to the current state of the envi-
ronment (hence context-variability place a critical role in workflows). Moreover,
due to the fact that changes in the environment happen spontaneously, we have to
be able to distribute a workflow during runtime.
Consequently, this gives rise to some fundamental and challenging issues, such as
context variability, context-awareness and security, which need to be considered
at the specification, design and implementation stages of workflows. Therefore,
it is important to be able to specify exact rules and constraints that prevent unau-
thorised participants from executing sensitive tasks and also to prevent tasks from
accessing unauthorised services. Furthermore, workflows can hold and manip-
ulate various data at different contexts and with different security requirements.
Hence it is important to be able to enforce these requirements while the data is be-
ing accessed in a workflow instance. Delegations constraints over authorisations,
audit and integrity provide additional security features. For example, medical sce-
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narios will require that only authorised doctors are permitted to perform certain
tasks and that only specific machines are used in those tasks. If a workflow exe-
cution cannot guarantee these requirements, then the workflow will be rejected.
Currently, there is no commonly accepted model for secure workflows or even a
consensus on which features a workflow security model should support. Through-
out the thesis, we have adopted a policy-based approach in which rules are speci-
fied compositionally as policies which can be analysed and continually verified at
run-time. These are expressed using simple Boolean guards, over state variables
and/or variables within context frames, within conditional or interrupt constructs.
Most policy models that are available today, e.g. [6, 71], are of a static nature —
it is difficult to express security requirements that are dependent on time or the
occurrence of events, let alone represents contexts. Temporal aspects of access
control are, for example, especially important in domains ranging from E-business
to military domain where the value of tactical information, and therefore its pro-
tection requirements, are highly dependent on time (e.g. time to start an activity,
a period of time where an injection has to be induced or period allowed to claim
cost of a shipment) and events (e.g. adversary action, coalition formation, new
drugs came to market or more faster processor).
Other work, e.g. [21, 23], has recognised the need for more expressive security
policies to capture the temporal dimension of access control, however, these mod-
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els lack compositionality. By compositionality we mean that the overall security
policy can be composed out of smaller Boolean rules (policies). This is advanta-
geous as each policy can capture specific requirements that can be validated and
verified individually and are then composed to form the overall system policy.
Another important issue which has been highlighted by various authors, for exam-
ple, [40,134,147] is that there is no workflow language available for the specifica-
tion, modelling and designing context-aware workflow which takes into account
security, timing and adaptability issues in a unified and coherent fashion. Al-
though context adaptation can be considered as the exception to the normal work-
flow and hence may be handled through database triggers and event-condition-
action rules, [33,147], our central philosophy here is that context-awareness, tim-
ing and security issues are the norm in workflow systems which operate in real
environments that are becoming more and more pervasive and complex.
8.2 Research Question
Once identified that workflow system and its management are intrinsically
• context-aware,
• and as they cross the boundaries of many organisations (contexts), they are
security-critical and that security consideration is paramount,
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• highly distributed and
• time-critical.
We were able to articulate the research question as follows:
How can we design, develop and build a context-aware, secure
workflow system in an integrated fashion?
the quest to answer this question has led to various sub-questions which needed
to be addressed. These were
1. What is the “nature" of context in workflow systems?
2. What are the various considerations or dimensions of “security" in the pres-
ence of mobility and context-awareness?
3. How do we “model" these system, with attributes such as being highly dis-
tributed, context-aware, time-dependent, allow mobility and being security-
critical?
4. Policy-based approaches have been shown to be valuable tools, how can
these policies be represented within context-awareness?
5. Being highly distributed, is there a more efficient mechanism for the de-
sign and development of context-aware, secure workflow systems that is
amenable to analysis?
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6. Is there a provision for animation?
This thesis has dealt with these sub-questions and provided a unique mechanism
for answering the main research question.
• 1. What is the “nature" of context in workflow systems? and
2. What are the various considerations or dimensions of “security" for such
systems?
In Chapter (2), we have given a general overview of workflows and their
importance in everyday businesses and enterprises. Often, workflows
are conflated with business processes; In this thesis we have taken the
view that both are identical unless we explicitly state the difference.
There are two major concerns in current workflow system develop-
ment. The first is security considerations and the second is context
awareness.
Modern workflow systems cross the boundaries of organisations, each
has its own security requirements, policies and constraints. Even within
one organisation, activities in a workflow systems may be executed, in
one of its instances, within a platform but in another instance it may
be executed or performed on a different platform with completely dif-
ferent environment. Indeed it may not even be automated.
We have reviewed in some details Workflow Management Systems to-
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gether with the associated Workflow Reference Model which is a de
facto standard produced by the Workflow Management Coalition. We
have also reviewed basic security requirements for workflow systems
and it was clear that current Workflow Management Systems do not
adequately deal with these requirements in the presence of contexts
which change constantly.
In addition, within a highly dynamical environment, the notion of
adaptability plays a central role in the design and implementation of
workflow systems. There are various approaches to deal with adapt-
ability of workflows which can be classified as run-time, automated
and instance-based. However, none of them deal with adaptation at a
secure context level.
• 3. How do we “model" these system, with these attributes, correctly? and
4. Policy-based approaches have been shown to be valuable tools, how can
these policies be context-aware?
In Chapter (3), we have given a detail description of the computational
model for our Secure and context-aware workflows. It also presents
our design language CS−F low. In our model, there are two dis-
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tinct components: Activity and context. An Activity is the unit of
computation – it is a piece of work that contributes toward the accom-
plishment of a given (functional and business) goal. An activity starts,
executes and then terminates. Associated with an activity is one or
more context. Contexts can be an organisation, a device, a service
(e.g. web-based service) or a computational environment. An activity
starts in one context and may terminates in a different context (hence
its "association” with more than one context).
Each context is governed by a set of security policies which are con-
tinually changing due to either the occurrence of an event and/or the
passage of time. In the model, activities may be composed concur-
rently to produce a new activity which terminates if and only if all of
its components terminate.
It is also recognised that real-time is an important feature of an activ-
ity within workflow systems. From deadlines, and worst case execu-
tion times to delays, priorities and interrupts. We have carefully con-
sidered all these features and their associated specific constructs and
have made the appropriate provisions. Furthermore, in dealing with
real-time activities, our model has not made any of the usual simpli-
fied assumptions which are commonly used with real-time formalisms.
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For example, the maximal parallelism hypothesis (i.e., the availability
of an infinite number of resources), [129], and the instantaneous com-
munication assumption [101, 132].
The model is supported by a design language, known as CS−F low,
with which we are able to design and analyse workflows.
One powerful aspect of CS−F low is in its Boolean guard which can
be used to model context expressions as well as to describe security
policies, (Section(3.5.7)). In addition to the usual propositional opera-
tors such as negation (not) and conjunction (and): somewhere(α) ·G
is a spatial modal operator that hold if there exists (at least one) sub-
context in which G holds. (We note that the dual of this guard, i.e.
everywhere(α) ·G which holds if G hold everywhere within the con-
text α can also be defined). There is also a provision for mobility,
using the construct to(α), which upon execution, the current activity
is moved to another context α.
We also gave a sound formal semantics for CS−F low in a process
algebraic style as well as algebraic characterisation of the language is
also given (Chapter(4)). An algebraic characterisation of CS−F low
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is also given which has a dual purpose: to provide an algebraic seman-
tics of CS−F low and also can be used to manipulate and analyse (at a
textual level) CS−F low models. Such type of semantics can be used
as basis to develop equation theory that facilitates formal proofs.
• 5. Being highly concurrent, can we explore a more efficient mechanism for
the design and development of context-aware, secure workflow systems?
We have presented the notion of Communication-closed layer (Chap-
ter (5)). Such a notion can be seen as
– design principle of secure workflow applications,
– a layer-development methodology
Such an approach is amenable for the introduction of
– a programming construct which can offer a linguistic support for
information flow security and
– an efficient approach for both static and dynamic analyses for in-
formation security with an application such as that found in work
flows.
• 6. Is there a provision for animation?
Towards this aim, we have developed reduction rules for CS−F low in
Chapter(6). Reduction rules describe how an activity can be executed
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in a step-by-step fashion. Note that, the structural congruence, ≡,
(which we have given in Section(4.5)), together with the reduction re-
lation→ provide an operational semantics for CS−F low and are used
as the basis for validating (animating) by exploring various scenarios
of designs/models of CS−F low system.
The execution environment of CCA has been modified to include timing
issues as well as priorities constructs. In this chapter we also gave the
encoding procedure of CS−F low to be suitable of execution together
with few illustrative examples. The thesis ends with Chapter(7) which
models a part of a health care system, known as CAW .
8.3 Future Work
We list some of the many interesting outstanding issues which could be explored
in the future:
• Workflow Control Engine and distribution. To run workflows, a Work-
flow Control Engine (WCE) is required. An architecture of a WCE which
is capable of executing distributed workflows is needed. This requires de-
tailed exploration of workflow distribution. One of the challenges is that
when applications are modelled as workflows, normally, workflows are run-
ning on a workflow server. This implies that in order to interact with an
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application users need access to the workflow server where the workflow
representing the application is located. In a context-aware environment,
the accessibility of a user applications should be as high as possible de-
spite mobility. However, due to the restrictions of wireless communication,
the communication link between a user device and a workflow server may
break or become unusable (e.g. due to quality constraints). This results
in restrained accessibility. Obviously there are several approaches which
can be explored. These include: approaches with a centralized server, ap-
proaches with many servers and totally distributed approaches. Each has its
own advantages and disadvantages.
Another challenge is related to reconfiguration. Due to the highly dynamics
nature of the computing environment addressed here, it is difficult or even
impossible to foresee the configuration of an environment before applica-
tion startup or even during its execution. The WCE, therefore, has to enable
various forms of adaptation/re-configuration, which alter the current state of
the workflow distribution in the system. The purpose of these adaptations
is to compute new workflow fragmentations and placements that are better
suited regarding the current and projected behaviour of workflows and the
expected context. Adaptations are triggered when the actual state of the
context is violating the assumptions that led to the current distribution. If
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the adaptation is executed after a violation, a reactive strategy is followed.
However, if those deviations are anticipated before their actual occurrence,
a proactive strategy is applied for adaptation. We want to reason over the
current, past and future workflow behaviour to enable the following forms
of adaptation (just to mention a few): context, human, run-time state and
workflow re-planning.
• Proof system and Model Checker. We would like to develop a proof sys-
tem to CS−F low that allows us to proof various functional, timing, context
and security properties of a workflow. For example to show that an activity
will read sensor often enough so as (important) data are not missed.
Further, we wish to develop a theory of contextual equivalence for prov-
ing properties about contexts and context-awareness. We can envisage, as a
starting point, to adopt the style outlined in [102, 121] which is a standard
way of testing that two activities are contextually equivalent if and only if
they admit the same elementary observations whenever they are inserted in-
side any arbitrary enclosing activity. This however requires us to develop
a hierarchical structure to context. Currently, context in CS−F low have a
"flat” (or linear) structure.
• Property Language. We recognise that there is a need for a formal lan-
guage within which we may be able to express and prove desirable prop-
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erties about workflows. Such a language should be expressive to cater for
context, timing, mobility and performance properties as well as "functional”
properties. We have already shown how specific timing properties can be
expressed and reasoned about but there are more complex properties that
we wish to show specially those which require a continuous time domain as
oppose to discrete one. We wish to explore the hybrid nature of workflow
systems which may help in expressing various performance properties, for
example:
– "within t time unite it is likely that the temperature will rise above the
acceptable threshold”,
– " The employees in zone X should be trusted to a certain level”,
– "the probability to satisfactorily complete a particular activity is 75%”,
etc.
For this, we envisage using an extended version of a Temporal Logic ( e.g.
Interval Temporal Logic(ITL) [34], Probabilistic Computation Tree logic
(PCTL) [84] or Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [85]). This will require
mechanisms to integrate both formalisms, for example through the unifica-
tion of their semantic domains. A traditional way of doing so is by deriv-
ing the formal semantics of CS−F low in the chosen logic, which render
CS−F low to be Wide-Spectrum formalism and framework. We envisage
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that PCTL to be more appropriate as it has provision to express performance
properties.
Appendix A
CS−F low: Algebraic Laws
A.1 Declaration
(Decl −1) var x˜ in {P} ≡ P (i f x is not in P)
(Decl −2) chan x˜ in {P} ≡ P (i f x is not in P)
(Decl −3) var x˜ in {var y˜ in P} ≡ var y˜ in {var x˜ in P}
≡ var x˜, y˜ in { P}
A.2 Delay
(delay −1) delay (t1) ; delay (t2) ≡ delay (t1 + t2)
(delay −2) delay (0) ; P ≡ P
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A.3 Deadline
(Deadline −0) [0] P ≡ skip
(Deadline −1) [tP] P ; [tQ] Q ≡ [tP, tQ] (P ; Q)
(Deadline −2) [tP] P ‖ [tQ] Q v [max (tP, tQ)](P ‖ Q)
A.4 Sequential
(; −1) P ; (Q ; R) ≡ (P ; Q) ; R
(; −2) Q ; skip ≡ Q
≡ skip ; Q
A.5 Alternative
(Alt −1) (G → P 2 G → P) ≡ G → P
(Alt −2) (G → P 2 not G → P) ≡ P
(Alt −3) (G → P 2 not G → Q) ≡ not G → Q 2 G → P
(Alt −4) (c → (b → P 2 not b → Q) 2 not c → R) ≡
(b and c) → P 2 not (b and c) → (c → Q 2 not c → R)
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(Alt −5) b → P 2 not b → (c → P 2 not c → Q) ≡
b or c → P 2 not (b or c) → Q
(Alt −6) b → P 2 not b → (b → Q 2 not b → R) ≡
b → P 2 not b → R
(Alt −7) G1 → P 2 G2 → Q ≡ G2 → Q 2 G1 → P
(Alt −8) (G1→ R 2 G2→ S) ; P ≡ G1→ (R ; P) 2 G2→ (S ; P)
(Alt −9) true→ P 2 false→ Q ≡ P
(Alt −10) false→ P 2 true→ Q ≡ Q
(Alt −11) (G1 → P1 2 G2 → P2) v P2 (i f G2 ≡ true)
(Alt −12) G1→ R 2 G2→ S ≡ (G1 and R)or(G2and S)
(Alt −13) (G1 → R 2 G2 → S) 2 G3 → P ≡ (G1 → R) 2 (G2 → S 2 G3 → P)
(Alt −14) (G and (G1 → P 2 G2 → Q) ≡ G and G1 → P 2 G and G2 → Q)
(Alt −15) a → P 2 (b → Q 2 c → R) ≡ (a → P 2 b → Q) 2 (a → P 2 c → R)
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A.6 Interrupt
(Interrupt −1) (P .Gt Q) ‖ (S .Gt T ) ≡ (P ‖ S) .Gt (Q ‖ T )
(Interrupt −2) P .Gt+1 Q ≡ (P .Gt Q) .G1 Q
(Interrupt −3) P .Gt (Q .G0 R) ≡ P .Gt Q (i f G has become f alse during t)
(Interrupt −4) (P .truet Q) ; R ≡ Q ; R
A.7 Parallel
(‖ −1) P ‖ Q ≡ Q ‖ P
(‖ −2) P ‖ (Q ‖ R) ≡ (P ‖ Q) ‖ R
(‖ −3) P ‖ skip ≡ P
≡ skip ‖ P
(‖ −4) 〈 〉 ‖ 〈 〉 ≡ skip
(‖ −5) (Chan!v) ; P ‖ (Chan?x) ; Q ≡ P ‖x := v ; Q
(‖ −6) P ‖ (G1→ R 2 G2→ S) ≡ G1→ (R ‖ P) 2 G2→ (S ‖ P)
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A.8 Assignment
(asgn−1) <>:= <> ≡ skip
A.9 Somewhere
(somewhere −1) somewhere(α) · G {P} ‖ somewhere(α) · G {Q}
≡
somewhere(α) · G {P ‖ Q}
(somewhere −2) somewhere(α) · G1 {P} ‖ somewhere(α) · G2 {P}
≡
somewhere(α) · (G1 and G2) {P}
(somewhere −3) somewhere(α) · true {skip} ≡ skip
(somewhere −4) somewhere(α) · true {abort} ≡ abort
(Note that (Somewhere3&−4) can be generalised to:
somewhere(α) · true {P} ≡ P)
Note that (somewhere-1) is a special case of (somewhere-2) and that (somewhere-
3) and (somewhere-4) are special cases of: somewhere(α).trueP ≡ P
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A.10 abort
(abort −1) abort ≡ while true do skip od
(abort −2) abort ; P ≡ abort
(abort −3) abort ‖ P ≡ abort
A.11 Loop
(Loop −1) P ≡ Q ⇒ while G {P} ≡ while G {Q}
(Loop −2) while G {P} ≡ G → P ; while G {P}
Appendix B
CS−F low: Structure Congruence
Table B.1 – Structural congruence for activities
(S1) P≡ P
(S2) P≡ Q ⇒ Q≡ P
(S3) P≡ Q, Q≡ R ⇒ P≡ R
(S4) P≡ Q ⇒ P ‖R≡ Q ‖R
(S5) P≡ Q ⇒ α 〈 x˜ 〉 : {P} ≡ α 〈 x˜ 〉 : {Q}
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Appendix C
CS−F low: Reduction Rules
Table C.1 – Reduction Rules-1
P→ P′ ⇒ var x˜ in {P }→ var x˜ in {P′ } (Reduction Var)
P→ P′ ⇒ chan x˜ in {P }→ chan x˜ in {P′ } (Reduction Chan)
P→ P′ ⇒ α 〈x˜〉 : {P}→ α 〈x˜〉 : {P′} (Reduction Contxt)
P→ P′ ⇒ C (P)→ C (P′) (Reduction Contxt)
P→ P′ ⇒ P ‖Q→ P′ ‖Q (Reduction Par)
P≡ Q, Q→ Q′, Q′ ≡ P′ ⇒ P → P′ (Reduction ≡)
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Table C.2 – Reduction Rules - 2
(Chan ? y˜) ; P ‖ (Chan ! z˜) ; Q
→ P{y˜← z˜} ‖ Q (Reduction Com-1)
α : {(Chan ? y˜) ; P ‖ Q} ‖ β : {(Chan ! z˜) ; R ‖ S}
→ α : {P(y˜← z˜) ‖ Q} ‖ β : {R ‖ S} (Reduction Com-2)
α : (Chan ? y˜ ; P ‖ Q) ‖ β : (α : (Chan ! z˜ ; R ‖ S)
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜)) ‖ β : (R‖ S) (Reduction Com-3)
α : (β : (Chan ? y˜ ; P ‖ Q)) ‖ β : (Chan ! z˜ ; R ‖ )
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜) ‖ Q) ‖ β(R ‖ S) (Reduction Com-4)
α : (β : (Chan ? y˜ ; P ‖ Q)) ‖ β : (α : ((Chan ! z˜ ; R ‖ ))
→ α : (P(y˜ ← z˜) ‖ Q) ‖ β(R ‖ S) (Reduction Com-5)
β : {to(α) ; P ‖ Q} ‖ α : {R}
→ α : {β : {P ‖ Q} R} (Reduction Mob)
Appendix D
Proof Rules for Timing Properties
duration (D), within (W ), after ( A ), between ( B ) and every ( E ).
D.1 duration – D
Let primitive ∈ {!,?,x := v, skip}. We have
(Dur−0) primitive |= D ≥ 1
(Dur−1)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m
P ; Q |= D ≥ (n+m)
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(Dur−2)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m
P ‖ Q |= D ≥ max(n,m)
(Dur−3)
P |= D ≥ n
[S] P |= D ≥ n
(Dur−3a)
P |= Φ
[S] P |= Φ
(Dur−4) (Dur−4) [S] P |= D ∈ S
(Dur−5)
P |= D ≥ n,
G
(while G do P od) |= D ≥ n
(Dur−6)
P |= D ≥ n,
Q |= D ≥ m,
G1 at tα ∨ G2 at tα
(G1 → P2 G2 → Q) |= D ≥ min(n,m)
(Dur−7)
P |= D ≥ n
(P .falset Q) |= D ≥ (n+ t)
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(Dur−8) delay(n) |= D ≥ n
D.2 within – W
(within−1) P |= W (n,P (t))
P ; Q |= W (n,P (t))
(within−2)
P |= W (n,P (t))
[S]P |= W (n,P (t))
(within−3)
P |= W (n,P (t)),
P |= D = (n+m)
P |= W (n+m, P (t))
(within−3a)
P |= ∨t ∈ [tα,tβ] P (t)
P |= D ≤ n
P |= W (n,P (t))
(within−4)
P |= D ≤ n,
P |= ∨σ ∈ [tα,tβ] P (t)
P |= W (n,P (t))
(within−5) P |= D ≤ n
P ‖Q |= W (n,P (t))
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D.3 after – A
(a f ter−1) P |= A (n,P (t))
P ; Q |= A (n,P (t))
(a f ter−2) P |= A (n,P (t))
P ‖Q |= A (n,P (t))
(a f ter−3)
Q |= A (n,P (t)),
P |= D ≥ m
P ; Q |= A (n+m,P (t))
D.4 between – B
(between−1)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
A ‖ B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
(between−2)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
A ; B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
(between−3)
A |= B (P(t),n,Q(t)),
B |= B (P(t),m,Q(t))
m ≤ n
A ; B |= B (P(t),n,Q(t))
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(between−4)
A |= B (P(t), l,Q(t)),
B |= B (P(t), l,Q(t)),
A |= D = n,
B |= D = n
A ‖ B |= B (P(t), l,Q(t))
D.5 every – E
(every−1)
m ≥ n,
P |= A (n, P (t)),
P |= D = m
(while G do P od) |= E (m, A (n, P (t)))
(every−2)
P |= E (n, P (t)),
Q |= E (m, Q (t))
(P ‖ Q) |= E (n, P (t)) ∧ E (m, Q (t))
(every−3)
P |= D = l,
∃ m • (m.n = l),
P |= E (n, P (t)),
Q |= E (n, P (t))
(P ; Q) |= E (n, P (t))
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(every−4)
P |= W (l,P (t)),
P |= D = m
([m.n] while G = n do P od) |= E (m, W (l,P (t)))
D.6 General Rules
(Weaken)
P |= Φ
Φ ⇒ Ψ
Ψ |= P
(and)
P |= Φ
P |= Ψ
P |= Φ ∧ Ψ
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